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Kobus: Establishing Corporate Counsel's Right to Sue for Retaliatory Dis

ESTABLISHING CORPORATE COUNSEL'S RIGHT
TO SUE FOR RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
I. INTRODUCTION

Today's in-house attorneys can be placed in a difficult situation when
confronted with employers' illegal and unethical activities or requests. Consider
a situation where an employer asks a faithful company employee to do
something that is clearly illegal, such as violate a statute,' testify falsely2 or
4
distort records.' The employee refuses to do so and is subsequently fired.
Another employee reports to the company or outside officials that the company
is engaged in an illegal activity and recommends that the company comply with
the law.' This reporting employee is also fired. 6 The troublesome question
surrounding these situations is whether either employee will be able to sue the
employer for retaliatory discharge. 7

1. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (involving an
employee discharged for refusing to participate in an illegal scheme to fix retail gasoline prices);
Kelsay v. Motorola, 384 N.E.2d 353 (Il. 1978) (holding that retaliatory discharge of workers'
compensation claimant was actionable).
2. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)
(involving an employee discharged after refusing to follow his employer's instructions to make
certain false and untrue statements in his testimony before a legislative committee); Odell v. Humble
Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir.) (involving subpoenaed employees who gave testimony
detrimental to their employer and were fired as a result), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953).
3. See, e.g., Trombetta v. Detroit, 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (involving an
employee discharged for refusing to manipulate and adjust sampling results used for pollution control
reports).
4. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (111.1981) (involving
an employee discharged for informing a local law enforcement agency that another International
Harvester employee might be violating the criminal code); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont,
246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (involving an employee discharged in retaliation for his efforts to
require his employer to operate in compliance with the state and federal consumer credit protection
laws); Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, 542 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (protecting an employee
who notified police that his employer's trucks were overloaded in violation of state law); Petrik v.
Monarch Printing Corp., 444 N.E.2d 588 (II1.App. Ct. 1982) (upholding a cause of action for an
employee who reported illegal accounting procedures to his superiors).
6. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
7. The cause of action for retaliatory discharge is a narrow exception to the general rule of
employment-at-will. It is based on the principle that some reasons for discharging an employee are
so contrary to public policy as to be actionable. See Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n., 465
N.W.2d 395, 401 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991). The tort attempts to maintain a proper balance between
the employer's interest in conducting a business efficiently and profitably, the employee's interest
in earning a living, and society's interest in having its public policies carried out. Balla v. Gambro,
Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 108 (II1. 1991).
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Thirty years ago, virtually no legal protection existed either for any type
of whistleblower,5 or for employees who refused to follow their employer's
instructions to violate the law. 9 Under the traditional common law doctrine of
employment-at-will,' 0 there existed a presumption that an employer or an
employee could sever an employment relationship for any reason, or for no
reason at all, absent an existing employment contract for a fixed term. " Strict
application of the at-will employment doctrine leaves employees without a
remedy when discharged in retaliation for either blowing the whistle on their
employers' illegal conduct, or refusing to follow their employers' illegal
requests.' 2

8. A whistleblower is one who, in good faith, publicizes or discloses the potential harmful
conduct of present or past employers, supervisors or co-workers. See Robert D. Boyle, A Review
of Whistleblower Protections and Suggestions for Change, 41 LAB. L.J. 821, 822 (1990); DANIEL
P. WESTMAN, WHISTLESLOWINO: THE LAW OF RErAuATORY DISCHARGE 19 (1991).
The term "whistleblower" is derived from the act of an English bobby blowing his whistle to
alert other law enforcement officers of the commission of a crime. See Winters v. Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 727 ('ex. 1990). There have been numerous events
where whistleblowing was a factor. "Among the more highly publicized events... are Watergate,
Love Canal, Three Mile Island and the Challenger shuttle disaster." Id. at 729-30. This note will
use the term whistleblower to describe not only those who report the wrongdoing of an employer,
but also those employees who refuse to violate the law at the suggestion of their employer.
9. See WESTMAN, supra note 8, at vii.
10. See generally Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (explaining
theories and application of the traditional common law rule). A detailed discussion of the historical
development of the at-will rule is contained in Jay M. Feinman, 7he Development of the Employment
at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976). For further explanation of the employment-at-will
doctrine, see Venessa F. Kuhlmann-Macro, Blowing the Whistle on the Employment At-Will
Doctrine, 41 DRAKE L. REv. 339 (1992); Seymour Moskowitz, Employment-At-Will & Codes of
Ethics: 7he Professional'sDilemma, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 33 (1988); Brian Heshizer, he New
Common Law of Employment: Changes in the Concept of Employment at Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 95
(1985); Joan M. Krauskopf, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modem At Will
Rule, 51 U. Mo.-KAN. CITY L. REv. 189 (1983).
, 24 U. RICH. L. REv. 187
11. Cheryl S. Massingale, At-Will Employment, Going, Going ...
(1990). See also DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980) (affirming the
district court's holding that the term of employment is discretionary and either party may terminate
the employment at any time for any reason, and therefore, no action may be maintained for breach
of the employment contract); Maguire v. American Family Life Insurance Co., 442 So. 2d 321 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that without an employment contract specifically obligating both the
employer and the employee to a definite term of employment, the employment is considered
indefinite and terminable at the will of either party); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 250 S.E.2d 442
(Ga. 1978) (finding that absent a controlling contract, permanent employment, or employment for
life is for an indefinite period, terminable at the will of either party); Harrod v. Wineman, 125 N.W.
812, 813 (Iowa 1910); Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1895); Payne v.
Western & At. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (Tenn. 1884) (holding that in the absence of a
written contract an employer could discharge an employee at any time for good cause, for no cause
or even for a morally wrong cause), rev'd on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134
(Tenn. 1915).
12. See Kuhlmann-Macro, supra note 10, at 400.
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The employment-at-will doctrine has been narrowed considerably in recent
years.' 3 Courts have gradually eroded the at-will employment doctrine by
creating exceptions. 1 4 The most widely recognized exception to the at-will
employment rule is the public policy exception.'5 A cause of action for
wrongful discharge, 6 which is actually a subpart of the public policy
exception, allows an employee to sue an employer if the employee's discharge
was based on a reason that was offensive to public policy. 7
More than half of the states now recognize the public policy exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine.' This recognition became widespread in the
late 1970s and the 1980s in both courts and legislatures. 9 The trend is toward

13. See Heshizer, supra note 10, at 95. "This common law employment-at-will doctrine has
been... progressively limited in recent years as increasing numbers of discharged employees have
successfully challenged the actions of their employers in court." Id.
14. See Massingale, supra note 11, at 188-200. Some of these exceptions include: statutory
and judicially created exceptions; the public policy exception; the implied contract exception; and
the good faith and fair dealing exception. See infra text accompanying notes 69-71 for a further
discussion of these exceptions.
15. Moskowitz, supra note 10, at 49. Generally, courts will apply the public policy exception
when an employee is discharged for exercising a statutory right such as filing a workers'
compensation claim, see, e.g., Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558 (Iowa 1988)

(applying the public policy exception to employees rightfully exercising a legal duty); Nees v.
Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (holding that an employer cannot discharge an employee for
serving on a jury), and for refusing to commit unlawful acts, see, e.g., Trombetta v. Detroit, T &
I.R.R., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (holding employer cannot discharge an employee
for refusing to commit unlawful acts).
16. For purposes of this note, the term "wrongful discharge" will be used interchangeably with
the term "retaliatory discharge." The term "wrongful discharge" is normally used to describe an
employee's unjust termination. "Retaliatory discharge," however, has a much more narrow meaning
and describes an employer's retaliation against an employee for the employee's action which
negatively affected the employer.
17. The term public policy eludes precise definition. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 236 P. 210, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1925) (stating that "[the question, what is public
policy in a given case, is as broad as the question of what is fraud"). Another court stated that
public policy is "anything which tends to undermine the sense of security for individual rights,
whether of personal liberty or private property, which any citizen ought to feel, is against public
policy." Noble v. City of Palo Alto, 264 P. 529, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928). Another statement,
sometimes referred to as a definition, is that "whatever contravenes good morals or any established
interests of society" is against public policy. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d
25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
18. See JAMEs N. DERTOUZOS ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
WRONGFUL TERMINATION, Rand Report R-3602-ICJ 13 (1988). By 1985, 37 states recognized the
public policy exception, 31 recognized the implied contract exception, and five recognized the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception. Id.
19. The following states adopted the public policy exception in the 1970s: Idaho; Jackson v.
Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977); Illinois; Kelsey v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d
353 (Il1. 1978); Michigan; Trombetta v. Detroit, T & I.R.R., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App.
1978); New Hampshire; Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974); New Jersey;
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 399 A.2d 1023 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), rev'd on
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greater employee protection, and this can be seen in the extension and
development of protection for whistleblowers. Presently, federal and state laws

other grounds, 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980); Oregon; Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975);
Pennsylvania; Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974); West Virginia; Harless
v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
The following states adopted the exception in the 1980s: Alaska; Knight v. American Guard
& Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1986); Arizona; Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp.,
710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985); Arkansas; M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681 (Ark. 1980);
Connecticut; Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980); Parnar v.
Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982); Indiana; McClanahan v. Remington Freight
Lines, Inc., 517 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. 1988); Maryland; Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d
464 (Md. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987);
Minnesota; Phippa v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987); Nebraska; Shriner
v. Meginnis Ford Co., 421 N.W.2d 755 (Neb. 1988); Nevada; Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394
(Nev. 1984); New Mexico; Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 687 P.2d 1038 (N.M. 1984); North Carolina;Sides v. Duke Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1985); North Dakota; Krien v. Marion Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D.
1987); Oklahoma; Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989); Rhode Island; Cunmins v.
EG & G Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134 (D.R.I. 1988) (applying Rhode Island law); South Carolina;
Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 1985); South Dakota; Johnson v.
Kreiser's, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1988); Tennessee; Clanton v. Cain-Sloan, Co., 677 S.W.2d
441 (Tenn. 1984); Texas; Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985);
Washington; Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984); Wisconsin;
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradatreet, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
In some states, the public policy exception, particularly as it is applied to whistleblowers, has
been codified. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West 1987); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, §§ 831-39 (West 1988); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361 to 15.369 (West 1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 181.932 (West Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34: 19-1 to 34: 19-8 (West 1988);
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 1988); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. tit. 41, §§ 4113.51 to 4113.53
(Anderson 1991). There has also been some effort by Congress to codify whistleblower protection.
See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. I 1990) (protecting
employees against retaliatory discharge for reporting employer violations); National Labor Relations
Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1),(3),(4) (1982) (precluding discharge of employees for union
activity, protected concerted activity, filing charges, and testifying under the Act); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988) (prohibiting discharge on
the basis of age); Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1988)
(protecting against retaliatory discharge for reporting employer violations); Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1988) (prohibiting federal contractors from discriminating against
disabled); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988)
(protecting against retaliatory discharge for reporting employer violations); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1988) (prohibiting discharge on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin, or for exercising rights under the Act); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. IH1990) (prohibiting discrimination in the work
place on the basis of disability). See generally Susan Sauter, The Employee Health & Safety
Whistleblower Protection Act and the Conscientious Employee: The Potentialfor FederalStatutory
Enforcement of the Public Policy Exception to Employment at Will, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 513 (1990)
(providing further discussion on existing whistleblower protection).
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allow employees to sue their employers for retaliatory discharge." These
statutes explain the conditions under which whistleblowing is legally protected,
how whistleblowers can obtain protection, and the remedies available to
whistleblowers.
In most American jurisdictions today, fired employees in the previously
described situations can assert a claim of wrongful discharge against their

20. The trend at both the federal and state level is toward greater legal protection for
whistleblowers against the retaliatory acts of employers. At the federal level, anti-retaliation
provisions in numerous civil rights laws and labor laws protect whistleblowers who exercise specific
rights granted under these statutes. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1988) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, or national
origin); National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982) (prohibiting
termination of employees due to union activity). In addition, the Civil Reform Act of 1978 created
the U.S. Merit System Protection Board to protect federal employees who "blow the whistle' on
fraud and waste. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978).
See infra text accompanying notes 343-54 for further discussion of the Civil Service Reform Act.
The Federal Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 increased the protection available to federal
government whistleblowers who disclose governmental waste, fraud, and abuse of power. See
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified at 5
U.S.C. 1201) (Supp. 11 1989). See infra text accompanying notes 346-51 for further discussion of
the Whistleblower Protection Act. Public sector whistleblowers also have constitutional protection
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. See infra text accompanying
notes 334-36 for a discussion of constitutional protection. See generally M. Kohn & M.D. Kohn,
An Overview of Federal and State Whistleblower Protection, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 99 (1986).
Many states have also enacted laws designed to protect whistleblowers from the retaliatory
actions of employers. The states that have enacted whistleblower protection statutes include:
Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 39.90.100 to 39.90.150(1987); Arizona, ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38531 to 533 (Supp. 1989); California, Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5 (West 1984); Colorado, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 50.5-101 to 50.5-107 (West 1990); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
31-51m (West 1989); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115 (1990); Florida, FLA. STAT.

ANN. §§ 112.3187 to 112.31895 (West 1986); Hawaii, RAW. REV. STAT. §§ 378-63 to 378-69
(Supp. 1987);Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, para. 395/1 (Smith-Hurd 1990);Indiana,IND. CODE

ANN. § 16-28-9-3 (West 1993); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 70A.28 to 29 (West Supp. 1986);
Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973 (1984); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.101 to 61.103
(Baldwin 1986); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17B, § 30: 2027 (West 1991); Maine, ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 831 to 840 (West 1983); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. S.P.P. §§ 3-301
to 3-310 (1993); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361 to 15.369 (West 1981); Minnesota,

MINN. STAT ANN. § 181.932 (West Supp. 1992); Missouri, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 105.055(1) to
105.055(6) (1987); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 281.611 to 281.671 (1993); New Jersey, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 34: 19-1 to 34: 19-8 (West 1986); New York, N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney
1988); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 41, §§ 4113.51 to 4113.53 (Anderson 1991); Oklahoma,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 309 to 323 (1992); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.505 to 659.545

(1992); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1421 to 1428 (Purdon 1983); Rhode Island, R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 36-15-3 to 36-15-9 (1984); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-27-10 to 8-27-50
(1988); Texas, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a (West 1989); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 67-21-1 to 9 (1985); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 42.41.010 to 42.41.900 (West
1992); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE §§ 6C-1-1 to 6C-1-8 (1988); and Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 230.80 to 230.85 (West 1984).
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employers."' However, if the employee was an in-house attorney,' no
recourse would be available. 23 Suits brought by in-house attorneys raise
different issues from suits by general employees' because of the special
attorney-client relationship.' Most courts have held that an in-house attorney
has no cause of action for wrongful discharge against an employer.' The two
most common reasons supporting these decisions are: (1) the traditional at-will
nature of the attorney-client relationship; and (2) the perceived adverse effects

21. See DERTOUZOS, supra note 18, at 13. See also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
22. The term in-house attorney is one of many names referring to an attorney who is employed
solely by a corporation. Other regularly used references include: house counsel, in-house counsel,
inside counsel, and corporate counsel. See Michael P. Allen, Balls v. Gambro: Retaliatory
Discharge of House Counsel, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 633, 633 n.4 (1992). The terms in-house
counsel, in-house attorney, house counsel, and corporate counsel will be used interchangeably
throughout this note. These terms are meant to indicate lawyers who work solely for one employer
or client. As defined by Black's Law Dictionary, in-house counsel refers to any "lawyer who acts
as an attorney for business though engaged as an employee of that business and not as an
independent lawyer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (6th ed. 1990). The court in General
Dynamics Corp. v. State of California,No. 93-E010883, 1993 WL 225346 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. July
8, 1993), used the term to describe "an attorney who provides legal services to a single client, a
business entity of relative size and sophistication, in return for a fixed salary." Id.
The status of the in-house attorney within the legal community has evolved significantly over
the years. Though in-house attorneys have existed in some organizations for decades, historically
attorneys at large viewed attorneys in corporate legal departments as lower quality attorneys. See
C. Barry Schaefer, Proposed Model Rule 5.4: Is it Necessaryfor Corporate Staff Counsel?, 15
CREIGHTON L. REv. 1 (1980).
Now many organizations have high-powered in-house legal
departments that rival elite law firms in size, qualifications, and expertise. See Who Represents
Corporate America, NAT'L L.J., July 1991, at S5; MARK C. PuCCETrIi, THE LAwYERs STATISTICAL
REPORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980S, 19

(1985) (noting a 40% growth in in-house counsel numbers between 1970 and 1980).
23. See Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 346-47 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986), cer?. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex.
1986), rev'dfor lack offederaljurisdiction, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988); McGonagle v. Union
Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 465
N.W.2d 81 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991); Balla
v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991); Michaelson v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 474
N.W.2d 174 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). See infra text accompanying notes 125-68 for further
discussion of these cases.
24. The term "general employees" will be used in this note to represent all non-attorney
employees.
25. Unlike general employees, attorneys occupy a special position in our society. See Herbster,
501 N.E.2d at 346. "In representing clients in civil and criminal matters their authority is extremely
broad. The attorney is placed in the unique position of maintaining a close relationship with a client
where the attorney receives secrets, disclosures and information that otherwise would not be divulged
to intimate friends." Id. Mutual trust, exchanges of confidence, reliance on judgment, and the
personal nature of the attorney-client relationship are all necessary for the attorney to effectively
represent the client, and demonstrate the unique position attorneys occupy in our society. Id. at 348.
Because of this close relationship and the need for effective legal assistance, the law imposes special
obligations upon the attorney.
26. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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on the attorney-client relationship.27 The purpose behind the attorney-client
relationship is to encourage full and candid consultation and to preserve the trust
between a client and a legal advisor by removing the fear of disclosure of
confidential information." Consequently, the law 29imposes special obligations
on the attorney by virtue of this close relationship.
Currently, there is a growing need for giving in-house attorneys the right
to sue for retaliatory discharge.' ° This originates from a recent trend of
corporations hiring in-house attorneys, instead of using outside law firms, to
resolve their legal problems.3 Thus, a growing number of in-house attorneys

27. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109. The major concern is the adverse effects that granting in-house
counsel the right to sue for retaliatory discharge may cause to the attorney-client relationship. See
Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 346-47; Nordling, 465 N.W.2d at 86. The primary objection to suits by
in-house counsel is that they would violate the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship and
destroy the trust necessary for an attorney to serve his client effectively. Herbster,501 N.E.2d at
346-47; Nordling, 465 N.W.2d at 86. The argument is that for in-house counsel to support a
retaliatory discharge suit, they would have to reveal confidential information obtained in the course
of representing the client. Consequently, clients know that their in-house attorneys may later sue
them and disclose certain confidential information to support their suits and may hesitate to fully
divulge all relevant information to the attorneys. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109. This result would
defeat the primary purposes of the attorney-client relationship, to encourage full consultation and to
preserve the trust between a client and the attorney. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 389 (1981).
28. See id. at 389.
29. See Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 347 (Ill. App. Ct.
Several factors which make the attorney-client
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987).
relationship special include: the attorney-client privilege regarding confidential communications, the
fiduciary duty an attorney owes to a client, the right of the client to terminate the relationship with
or without cause, and the fact that a client has both exclusive control over the subject matter of the
litigation and may dismiss or settle a cause of action regardless of the attorney's advice. Id. at 34648. See infra notes 220-38 for further discussion of the attorney-client relationship.
30. In 1964, it was estimated that less than one percent of all lawyers practiced in corporate law
departments. See A.B.A., LAW PRACTICE IN A CORPORATE LAW DEPARTMENT 1 (1964). Studies
conducted in the early 1980s indicated that about "50,000 lawyers were on corporate payrolls, a
figure double that of 15 years earlier." General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Ct., 876 P.2d 487,
491 (Cal. 1994). See also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.7.3 (1986); Grace
C. Giesel, The Ethics or Employment Dilemma ofIn-House Counsel, 5 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 535,
540-45 (1990). A recent study indicates that more than 10% of all lawyers in the United States are
employed as in-house attorneys by corporations. GeneralDynamics Corp., 876 P.2d at 491. See
also ABA YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION, 1990 THE STATE OF LEGAL PROFESSION 7 [hereinafter ABA
YOUNG LAWYERS]. According to some commentators, as law firms continue to grow and legal costs
increase, this percentage will continue to rise because corporate clients will bring legal services in
house to control legal costs. See MARK STEVENS, POWER OF ATrORNEY: THE RISE OF THE GIANT
LAW FIRMS 7-9 (1987).
31. The last two decades have seen noticeable growth in the number and professional status of
in-house counsel. Large corporations have increasingly turned inside for the procurement of legal
services. See Gen. Dynamics Corp., 876 P.2d at 491; see asn Anne B. Fisher, How to Cut Your
Legal Costs, FORTUNE, April 23, 1990, at 185. Numerous reasons have been given for this recent
development of corporate legal departments, ranging from corporations' attempts to cut the high
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will likely be confronted with difficult situations. Courts have held that like
other attorneys, in-house counsel are at-will employees and may be terminated
at any time with or without cause.32 However, unlike independent attorneys,
in-house attorneys have only one client: the corporation. Typically, when a
conflict arises between an attorney and a client, the recommended remedy is
withdrawal.13 Yet attorneys with the corporation as their sole client have found
withdrawal to be problematic and sometimes an unfeasible solution.' In-house
counsel are faced with a dilemma when their ethical obligations come into
conflict with their employer's requirements.35 They must choose between
maintaining their professional and ethical obligations and keeping their job and
risking reprimand or disbarment.' A new path must be created to provide
these attorneys with a solution to their dilemma, one that allows them to disclose
wrongdoing without the fear of unemployment.
This Note argues that in-house attorneys should have the right to sue for
retaliatory discharge and that a model statute should be developed to provide a
cause of action. Section II of this Note introduces the law of retaliatory
discharge, discusses the details of the law, and explains its application to general
employees.37 Section III discusses retaliatory discharge suits as they relate to
in-house counsel. This discussion includes an explanation of recent cases that
have dealt with the right of in-house attorneys to sue for retaliatory discharge,
the problems of extending the right to in-house counsel, and thejustifications for
allowing such suits.'
Section IV briefly examines the present statutory

costs of using outside law firms, "to the increasing complexity of the regulatory environment, to the
programmatic style characteristic of such organizations." General Dynamics Corp., 876 P.2d at
491. See also Lad Kuzela, Building In-House Legal Brigades, INDUSTRY WEEK, July 7, 1986, at
43.
32. See Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Iis., 501 N.E.2d 343, 347 (111. App. Ct.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987) (upholding the general rule "that a client may terminate
the relationship between himself and his attorney with or without cause"); Balla v. Gambro, Inc.,
584 N.E.2d 104, 109 (Ill.
1991) (stating that the rule that a client may discharge his attorney at any
time, with or without cause, applies equally to in-house counsel and outside counsel).
33. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmts. 14-16 (1990) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES]; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (1981) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE]. See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEoAL ETHICS § 9.5.3 (1986).
34. Daniel S. Reynolds, Wrongful Discharge of Employed Counsel, I GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
553, 575 (1988). Reynolds states that "[wlithdrawal is a seriously inadequate option for company
counsel, or indeed, any salaried lawyer who is the full-time, and perhaps long-term, employee of
a single client." Id.
35. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1408 (1967).
36. See Brian D. Forrow, The CorporateLaw Department: Counsel to the Entity, 34 Bus.
LAW. 1797, 1802-03 (1979). See also In re Capps, 297 S.E.2d 249 (Ga. 1982) (holding that an inhouse attorney was subject to discipline).
37. See infra notes 41-117 and accompanying text.

38. See infra notes 118-318 and accompanying text.
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protection that exists for whistleblowers and discusses the deficiencies of this
protection. 39 Finally, Section V proposes a model state statute which extends
the right to sue for retaliatory discharge to in-house counsel.'

II. BACKGROUND OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
Since the late 1950s, legislatures and courts have increasingly permitted
suits that limit employers' abilities to discharge employees when the interest of
The
the public or the individual in avoiding discharge is compelling. 4 '
retaliatory discharge cause of action is a category of these suits. The law of
retaliatory discharge prevents an employer from firing employees because the
employees have asserted their rights42 or have objected to or reported the
employer's wrongful conduct. 3 This is achieved by allowing the employee to

39. See infra notes 319-72 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 373-422 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988);
Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (upholding suit

for wrongful discharge). See supranotes 19-20 and accompanyingtext for a complete list of statutes
and court decisions allowing retaliatory discharge actions. The main reason that the courts and
legislatures have allowed these suits is because of the vast changes that America has gone through
in the last century. The fledgling businesses of the 19th century no longer need the protection that
was provided by the employment-at-will rule to mature and develop into stable businesses. See
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 509 (N.J. 1980). These businesses have
matured and developed to become enormous industries. Id.

American industry is no longer so delicate that its survival necessitates the subversion of
employee rights by the employment-at-will doctrine. Using the employment-at-will rule at the
present time can result in harsh treatment and consequences to employees by unscrupulous
employers. See Madelyn C. Squire, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine and a Social Justice Theory:
Are They a Response to the Employment At-Will Rule?, 51 U. Pirr. L. REV. 641 (1990). The
recognition of the harsh effects that the employment-at-will rule can produce has led many courts
and legislatures to grant a cause of action to wrongfully terminated employees. See also infra text
accompanying notes 64-67 for further details on the changes that have occurred in America.
42. The courts and legislatures are attempting to preserve numerous rights by allowing the
retaliatory discharge cause of action. For example, the employee's right to seek compensationunder
workers' compensationlaws for work-related injuries should not be interfered with by the employer.
See, e.g., Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co. Inc., 429 N.W.2d 558 (Iowa 1988); Kelsay v. Motorola,
384 N.E.2d 353 (I1. 1978); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.205 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994). The right not to participate in the illegal
activity or conduct of the employer has been held as a justification for allowing retaliatory discharge
suits. See, e.g., Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985); Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 1989). The
first amendment right to refuse to speak has also been held sufficient to support a retaliatory
discharge action. See, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983). Serving
on a jury has also been found to be a sufficient right of the employee and protected. See, e.g., TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 122.001 (Vernon 1986). Joining a union has also been found to be
a protected right of employees. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23: 823-24 (West 1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 179.10 (West 1966).
43. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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sue the employer for retaliatory discharge. The courts and legislatures
permitting this cause of action have determined that such a remedy is necessary
both to preserve the employees' ability to assert their rights and to promote the
public interest."
Courts have looked to statutes,4'
constitutional
provisions,' the common law,47 and" in certain instances, to professional
codes of ethics" to determine if the interests of the public and the employee
outweigh the employer's interests. 49
A. Employment-At-Will
One of the original barriers to the recognition of retaliatory discharge suits

44. The public has many interests which can be protected by allowing employees the ability to
sue for retaliatory discharge. The concern for the public safety has been one that the courts and
legislatures have regularly wanted to protect. See, e.g., Asbestos School Hazard Detection and
Control Act of 1980, 20 U.S.C. § 3608 (1988) (prohibiting retaliation against those who report
asbestos violations); Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (1988)
(prohibiting retaliation against miners reporting danger, safety, or health violations in mines). The
public's interest in preventing illegal activity has also been a concern that has been protected. See,
e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v.
Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34: 19-3(a)-(c) (West 1988).
45. See Parker v. M & T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 220 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989);
Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 465 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds,
478 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 1991). The Parker court found that the Conscientious Employee
Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34: 19-1 to 34: 19-8, "compels a retaliating employer to pay damages to
an employee-attorney who is wrongfully discharged or mistreated for refusing to join a scheme..
. which is violative of the law, fraudulent, criminal, or incompatible with a clear mandate of New
Jersey's public policy concerning public health, safety, or welfare." Parker, 556 A.2d at 220. The
Nordling court refused to consider the plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim because "as a matter of
law there was no violation of the [state's] whistleblower statute." Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 504.
Legislatures have enacted statutes that expressly grant certain individuals the right to sue for
retaliatory discharge. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text for a list of some of the statutes
that have been enacted.
46. The First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit federal,
state, and local governments from retaliating against whistleblowers. See infra text accompanying
notes 334-36 for further discussion of the constitutional issues.
47. The formation of the public policy exception is an example of a common law development
that courts have looked to when deciding retaliatory discharge cases. See, e.g., Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (111.1981). See infra text accompanying notes 81-104
for further discussion of the public policy exception.
48. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980) (stating that
"[e]mployces who are professionals owe a special duty to abide not only by federal and state law,
but also by the recognized codes of ethics of their professions'); Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins.
Ass'n., 465 N.W.2d 395, 397, 403 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding a judgment in favor of an inhouse attorney who was demoted for refusing to violate the Code of Professional Responsibility);
Wielder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 108-09 (N.Y. 1992) (finding that the Code of Professional
Responsibility placed a duty on an associate of a law firm to report a fellow associate's unethical
activities).
49. See Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512.
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by employees was the rule of law that employees were terminable at-will.
Since the end of the nineteenth century, federal and state courts have presumed
that employees are terminable at-will,"1 and thus can be fired for proper cause,
for no cause, or even for a morally unjust cause, without the employer being
liable. 2 At the same time, employees have the right to quit at any time and
for any reason.53 Thus, when the parties in an employment contract have not
specified a time period, neither party is bound to continue the employment
arrangement once either decides to terminate it.
In theory, the employment-at-will rule was simply a background
presumption of contract law that the parties were completely free to modify by
specific agreement. 5 The at-will employment rule was justified on the basis
of both the freedom of contract' and the freedom of enterprise57 doctrines.5"
This at-will presumption, along with the constitutional protection of the freedom

50. Until the late 19th century, American courts in situations involving indefinite term
employees avoided the issues of employment duration and required notice for discharge. See
Feinman, supra note 10, at 118. In 1877, this confused state of the law was resolved by Horace
Gray Wood's analysis of employment in his Treatise on the Law ofMaster and Servant. See H.G.
WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1977). He proposed a rule that
has become known as the employment-at-will doctrine. Wood proposed that when an employee was
hired for an indefinite period, a hiring at-will was created. Id. Wood's rule presumed that where
no employment period was specified, either party was free to terminate the employment relationship
at any time and for any reason. Id. General acceptance of the at-will employment rule was obtained
by the turn of the century. The quick acceptance of this rule was primarily based on the changes
that had occurred in society at that time. The economic and social circumstances of the nation no
longer favored the "paternalistic view that the master should take care of servants." Massingale,
supra note 11, at 188.
51. See Kewey H. Tucker, Note, Erosion of the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Recognition of
an Employee's Right to Job Security, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 593, 593 (1986) [hereinafter
Erosion]; United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 127 F. Supp. 934 (D.D.C.
1954). See generally ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, 3A EMPLOYMENT DISCRIIvtNATION
§ 117.20 (1991) (providing background on the employment-at-will doctrine).
52. See Blades, supra note 35, at 1405; Payne v. Western & Ad. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-

20 (Tenn. 1884), rev'd on other grounds, Hutton v. Watter, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
53. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAw 48 (1990).

54. See Erosion, supra note 51, at 593.
55. See WEILER, supra note 53, at 48.
56. The freedom of contract rationale supported the idea that both the employer and employee
should be free to create or terminate an employment relationship at any time. See Moskowitz, supra
note 10, at 38-40. The rule was influenced by the idea that "the employee had only such rights as
were expressly agreed to in his contract of employment-no more and no less." LARSON &
LARSON, supra note 51, at § 117.20 26-4.
57. The freedom of enterprise rationale is a 19th century concept, based on the efficiency of

the marketplace, which required that employers have the absolute right to fire employees who
hindered the employer's ability to produce at a profit. See Massingale, supra note 11, at 188-89.
58. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Workers' Rights Against Employers and Unions: Justice
Francis-AJudgefor Our Season, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 480, 481 (1970).
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to contract at the beginning of this century," made it nearly impossible for an
employee to successfully counter the at-will presumption.'
The early adherence of courts to the doctrine of at-will employment allowed
few exceptions to the at-will rule. 6' An employer was free to discharge an atwill employee without notice and for virtually any reason. While this
termination rule often caused harsh results,' it was thought necessary because
it promoted economic growth by affording business owners maximum control
over the workplace.' Today, however, the work environment is very different
from that of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There have been
significant changes in the number of people working,' the composition of the

59. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908). The Court reasoned that the
freedom to contract allowed an employer to dispense with the services of an employee for union
membership, as well as for "reason... whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice." Id. at 173. See also
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905) (striking down maximum hour regulations for
bakery employees). The Adair decision was effectively overruled in Texas & N.O. R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930), which accepted Congress' Commerce
Clause power to protect workers' rights to organize and bargain collectively, free from the
employer's discharge threats.
60. See WEiLER, supra note 53, at 48.
61. The exceptions that were recognized were based on specific violations of statutorily
protected rights. One early statute which expressly limited the employer's right to terminate
employees was the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988). This Act
prohibits termination of employees due to union activity. Id. §§ 157-158. Unionization and
collective bargaining agreements were the first limitations placed on the at-will rule. They limited
the employer's ability to terminate employees who were union members and covered by a collective
bargaining agreement. See Note, ProtectingEmployees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Public Policy Exception, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1931, 1934 (1983). These union agreements prohibited
the firing of unionized employees except for cause. Id. Subsequently, laws which created
obligations for employers and rights for employees served as a basis for exceptions to the at-will
doctrine if the termination was in violation of a statutorily protected right or obligation. See, e.g.,
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988) (setting wage and hour standards);
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988) (setting minimum safety
standards in the workplace).
62. See, e.g., Comerford v. International Harvester, 178 So. 894, 895-96 (Ala. 1938) (holding
that the plaintiff had no cause of action when discharged in revenge for a supervisor's unsuccessful
attempts to obtain the affections of the plaintiff's wife); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d
811, 812 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the plaintiff had no cause of action when terminated
after announcing the intent to attend law school at night).
63. See Feinnan, supra note 10, at 133-34. The common law developed in a laissez-faire
climate that encouraged industrial expansion and approved the right of an employer to control his
own business, including the right to fire an employee-at-will without cause. Id.
64. America has gone through immense changes in the 100 years since Wood's employment-atwill rule was announced. "In 1880 America's labor force consisted of 17,392,000 workers, or
47.3% of the population." Squire, supra note 41, at 649. "The employed work force in 1987 was
112,440,000, which accounted for 61.5% of the population." Id. Not only has the number of
workers increased in the past 100 years, but the average life expectancy has also increased. The
average life expectancy before 1900 was under 47 years, while life expectancy is currently over 70
years. Id. As a result of these changes, the quality of life has taken on more importance, with the
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workforce,' and the nature of businesses in our modern environment.' The
United States of America has become a nation of employees where the job of the
modern day worker is the most valuable asset.'
The changes that have occurred in the law and work environment have
contributed to a current employment environment that has many exceptions to

issues of job security and workplace dignity becoming greater concerns. Id. at 649-50. See
generally Elliot L. Beitner, Justice and Dignity: A New Approach to Discipline, 35 LAB. L.J. 500

(1984).
65. The composition of the nation's work force has also drastically changed. In 1890,
employed married women made up 13.9% of the labor force and 4.6% of the female population.
See Squire, supra note 41, at 650. The labor force in 1988 was made up of 59.2% married women
and 56.8% of the female population. Id. While many reasons exist for women's expanded
participation in the work force, the main reason is that two salaries are now needed to meet the
economic requirements of the family. See Employment Increases and Median Earnings in U.S.
Families, LAB. L. REP. (CCH) No. 141, at 4 (August 11, 1989).
66. The fledgling industries of the 1800s have developed from small and medium size
companies to become enormous corporations in which the ownership of the organization is separate
from management. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 509 (N.J. 1980);
Squire, supra note 41, at 650. Previously, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there
was a clear distinction between employers who were frequently owners of their businesses and
employees. See Pierce, 417 A.2d at 509. This role of the employer as being in complete control
of the business is no longer true. The old employer has been replaced by a superior in the corporate
hierarchy who is himself an employee. Id. This has lead to a nation of employees.
No longer is there a need to protect the now established business owners from unproductive
and troublesome employees; rather, it is the growing number of employees who now need to be
protected. See Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Damagesfor Wrongful Dischargeof At Will Employees, 26
WM. & MARY L. RLv. 449, 456 (1985). This "growth in the number of employees has been
accompanied by increasing recognition of the need for stability in labor relations." See Pierce, 417
A.2d at 509. Congress and state legislatures have responded to both this shifting balance of political
power away from corporations, and the need for stability in labor relations, by enacting statutes
promoting protective labor legislation for workers. See, e.g., Title VU of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) (prohibiting discrimination against any individual with respect
to hiring, discharge, compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); Age Discrimination Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1892 & Supp. V 1987) (promoting employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age and prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 756.25(1) (West 1984)
(prohibiting discharges for activities such as service on a jury); OR. REv. STAT. § 659.410 (1993)
(prohibiting discharge based on the filing of workers' compensation claims); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 7321(a) (1983) (prohibiting discharge based on refusal to submit to polygraph tests).
67. The recognition of this change in the work environment and the burden that firing a worker
has on the worker, led the courts and legislatures to readdress the employment-at-will doctrine. See,
e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (recognizing the burden that firing
places on the worker); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982
& Supp. V 1987) (imposing a duty on employers to furnish each employee a place of employment
free from recognized hazards that are likely to cause death or serious physical harm); Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Modification Act of 1989, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (Supp. 1989)
(requiring a covered employer to give 60-day advance notice before the employer may close a plant
or institute a mass layoff).
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the at-will presumption.' The three most successful exceptions to the at-will
doctrine are the public policy exception,' the implied contract exception, 7°
and the breach of good faith and fair dealing exception." These exceptions

68. Since the 1960s, the employment at-will rule has been criticized, and by the 1980s, the
majority of states had judicially created exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. See 82 AM.
JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge §7 (1992); Damian Edwards Okasinski, Annotation, In-House
Counsel's Right to Maintain Action for Wrongfid Discharge, 16 A.L.R. 5th 239, 246 (1993). See
infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text for examples of judicially created exceptions.
69. The public policy exception is based on the theory that the law should not permit an
employer to fire an at-will employee for reasons that violate public policy, such as terminating an
employee in retaliation for opposing an employer's illegal or unethical activities. See Okasinski,
supra note 68, at 246. "The public policy exception to the at-will doctrine injects into the at-will
relationship a shot of legal reality: employers who retaliate against employees for whistleblowing
may in some circumstances be subject to tort liability." See Kuhlmann-Macro, supra note 10, at
440. See infra text accompanying notes 81-104 for further discussion of the public policy exception.
70. Several states have recognized exceptions to the at-will doctrine based on contract theories.
These contract exceptions are independent of public policy considerations. The implied contract is
one contract theory that has been used to challenge terminations of at-will employees. See Heshizer,
supra note 10, at 104. An implied contract may be found in the terms of an employee handbook,
policy manual, memorandum, and oral statements made by the employer. Id. at 105. Under this
theory, courts have found that the circumstances, facts, or certain assertions by the employer have
either implied a contract for permanent employment, or modified the existing at-will agreement to
one of permanent employment, terminable only for good cause. Id. at 104-06
It is well recognized in law that contracts may be implied by circumstances, words or conduct.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTACTS § 4 (1986). The rationale for the implied contract
exception is based on the premise that statements or acts either indicating that an employee will be
terminated only for good cause, or otherwise giving assurance ofjob security, create in the employee
the expectation of permanent employment. A case illustrating breach of implied contract theory is
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980). In Toussaint,
the employer conducted conversations with the plaintiff-employee prior to the hiring. The defendantemployer stated in these conversations that the plaintiff would be with the company "as long as he
did his job." Id. at 891. The Michigan Supreme Court found that the oral statements made by the
employer when the plaintiff was hired were binding and created an implied contract. Id. at 885.
71. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is another contract-based doctrine which
has been successfully used by some plaintiffs in employment cases. The implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is designed to prevent abuses of unfettered discretion inherent in situations of
unequal bargaining power. See Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015 (Mont.
1984). The question of whether the "covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in a
particular case depends upon objective manifestations by the employer giving rise to the employee's
reasonable belief that he or she has job security and will be treated fairly." Id. at 1020.
Several states have held that the parties to a contract have an implied duty to exercise good
faith and fair dealing in the performance of contracts. See Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,
364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56 (Mass. 1977); Faust & Forden, Inc. v. Greenbaum, 421 S.W.2d 809,
813 (Mo. 1967); Rees v. Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp., 332 F.2d 548, 552 (7th Cir. 1964). See
generally Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good
Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV. 369 (1980). Failure to exercise good faith constitutes bad faith and such
conduct may give rise to the application of tort remedies. Many of the jurisdictions that recognize
the good faith exception to employment-at-will base the requirement of good faith on the long
standing concept that at common law there "exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing" in every contract. See generally 1 WILUSTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
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have been developed on a case-by-case basis and vary widely in acceptance
among the states. 72
In addition to the common law exceptions to the at-will employment
doctrine, federal and state legislatures enacted statutes in the 1970s to protect
both employees who exercised statutory rights' and whistleblowers74 by
allowing them to sue for retaliatory discharge.75 The degree of protection
afforded by these federal and state statutes to employees was, however, limited.
Although the federal whistleblower statutes provide broad protection for
government employees, 76 they offer limited protection to private employees.'
The state whistleblower statutes vary in the degrees of protection given to
employees fired for refusing to violate the law or for reporting an employer's

§ 670 (3d ed. 1961).
In a recent Montana case, Stark v. Circle K Corp., 751 P.2d 162 (Mont. 1988), the Montana
Supreme Court upheld a sizable award for the plaintiff based on breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Id. at 169. The court stated that Stark experienced objective manifestations
reasonably giving rise to a belief of job security. Stark had received several promotions, his wages
increased from minimum wage to $20,000 per year, he consistently received positive job
evaluations, and he was deemed an asset to the corporation. Id. at 166. This case shows the
growing acceptance of the good faith and fair dealing exception to the at-will doctrine.
72. See Mallor, supra note 66, at 456.
73. See, e.g., Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988) (forbidding
discharge of private-sector employees based on their refusal to take polygraph tests or test results);
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1988) (prohibiting discharge of
private-sector employees for filing complaints or testifying at hearings); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 8307c (West 1983) (forbidding discharge for filing workers' compensation claim).
74. See, e.g., Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (1982) (protecting
federal employees from discharge for whistleblowing); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. § 585 1(a) (1988) (prohibiting retaliation by employers licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission against whistleblowers); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West 1987) (allowing
employees who are fired for reporting to public officials to sue their employers).
75. The reason for the enactment of these statutes was primarily the changing environment of
the workplace. The legislatures started to realize the difficult situation that employees were being
placed in by their employers. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text for further discussion
on the changes that have occurred in the workplace.
76. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(a) (1982) (protecting federal
employees from discharge for whistleblowing); Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. §
1201 (Supp. U 1990) (strengthening protections granted under the CSRA by setting a deadline and
requiring the government to withhold witness's identity); WESTMAN, supra note 8, at 50-51.
77. See Boyle, supra note 8, at 822. Federal whistleblower statutes protect private employees
primarily from retribution for enforcing only certain public health statutes. See, e.g., Asbestos
School Hazard Detection & Control Act of 1980, 20 U.S.C. § 3608 (1988) (prohibiting retaliation
against those who report asbestos violations); Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30
U.S.C. § 815(c) (1988) (prohibiting retaliation against miners reporting danger, safety or health
violations in mine).
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wrongdoing.' In fact, twenty-one states protect only public employees,' and
one state, Montana, has statutorily abolished the employment-at-will doctrine,
requiring that all discharges be for cause.'
B. Public Policy Exception
The public policy exception arises when an employee alleges that the reason
for the discharge violates a public policy right that the employee exercised."'
Federal and state courts have created this exception to provide relief and
protection to employees discharged for reasons contrary to a clearly mandated

78. New Jersey's Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) is a typical example of a
statute providing broad protection for both private and public employees. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
34: 19-1 to 34: 19-8 (West 1988). New Jersey prohibits retaliatory action against employees who
disclose or threaten to disclose to superiors or a public body that the employer is acting unlawfully,
employees who cooperate with a public investigation of the employer's unlawful conduct or
employees who refuse to perform acts that are in "violation of a law, . . . fraudulent or criminal,
or . . . incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or
welfare." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34: 19-3(a)-(c) (West 1988). Under the statute, an aggrieved
employee may sue for reinstatement, compensation for lost wages and benefits, attorney's fees, and
punitive damages. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34: 19-5 (West 1988). The employer is also subject to a
civil fine. 1d.
None of the existing statutes specifically address the rights of in-house counsel to sue. There
has only been one attempt to enact a whistleblower stute that would address the in-house attorney,
in Illinois, but this legislation was never passed. See Elliott M. Abramson, Wy Not Retaliatory
Dischargefor Attorneys: A Polemic, 58 TENN. L. REV. 271, 282 (1991). For the text of the
proposed Illinois legislation, see infra note 365.
79. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 39.90.100(1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-50.5-101 (1989);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.40.010 to 42.40.900 (West 1990). For the most up-to-date list of
statutes, see 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (1992).
80. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (1991).
81. The public policy exception first appeared as a suspension of the at-will rule for the benefit
of an employee who had refused to commit an unlawful act. See, e.g., Petermann v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959). In recognizing a cause of action for the employee,
the Petermann court reasoned that "[itlo hold that one's continued employment could be made
contingent upon his commission of a felonious act at the instance of his employer would be to
encourage criminal conduct upon the part of both the employee and employer and would serve to
contaminate the honest administration of public affairs." Id. at 27.
A majority of states have adopted this form of the public policy exception, favoring the
employee in cases where an employee is discharged for refusing to act in violation of a penal statute.
See generally Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust DischargeReform Heads Toward
Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 59 (1988). Additionally, some state courts have expanded the
exception to protect employees who are fired for performing important public obligations, such as
jury duty or for exercising statutory rights or privileges, such as applying for workers' compensation
benefits.

See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 515-16 (Or. 1975); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,

384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978); Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind.
1973).
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public policy.' Courts have required a clear mandate that a particular policy
be necessary to protect the public interest.' When a discharge contravenes a
clearly mandated public policy in any way, the employer has committed a legal
wrong and the public policy exception applies. However, "where no clear
mandate of public policy is involved," the employer reserves the right to fire
employees at-will.s 4 The rationale behind the public policy exception is that
the employer has a duty to refrain from firing an employee for reasons that
contravene fundamental principles of public policy." Courts have developed
the tort of retaliatory discharge to further the public policy exception and to
restrict management's absolute right to discharge at-will employees.s These
suits are intended to encourage employees to object to unlawful conduct by their
employers and, ultimately, to reduce unlawful conduct by employers.'
In applying the public policy exception, courts have attempted to balance
the importance of the policy requiring protection against the burden created by

82. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (111.1981). There
is no exact definition of what constitutes a clearly mandated public policy. "In general, it can be
said that public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State
collectively. [A] matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties and responsibilities
before the tort will be allowed." Id. at 878. This clear mandate is usually found through reference
to state statutes and constitutional provisions and, when they are silent, in its judicial decisions. Id.
Most courts do not attempt to define the term public policy. Instead, they explain that public
policy must be determined on a careful, case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Petermann v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. 1959); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421
N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Ill. 1981). Many courts also state that the exception is to be narrowly
construed and cautiously applied only in those situations where the public policy issue is clearly
mandated. See Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 29 (Okla. 1989) (stating that "the public policy
exception must be tightly circumscribed".); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 84041 (Wis. 1983) (explaining that the exception is "limited" and "narrowly circumscribed" and that
"[c]ourts should proceed cautiously when making public policy determinations"); Johnson v.
Kreiser's, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225, 227 (S.D. 1988) (stating that the exception is narrow).
83. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (11. 1981); Leach v.
LauhoffGrain Co., 366 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (111.App. Ct. 1977); Parnr v. American Hotels, 652
P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 399 A.2d 1023, 1025-26 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), rev'd on othergrounds, 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
84. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (I11. 1981) (quoting
Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 366 N.E.2d 1145 (111. App. Ct. 1977)).
85. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1335-36 (Cal. 1980) (citing
WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 613 (4th ed. 1971)). See Reynolds, supra

note 34, at 559.
86. See Heshizer, supra note 10, at 103.
87. Allowing employees the right to sue for retaliatory discharge would deter employers from
firing workers who "blow the whistle," and this would ultimately reduce the unlawful conduct by
employers. See Parker v. M & T Chems. Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 220 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989).
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Jurisdictions differ as to what
the limitations on managerial discretion.'
constitutes a sufficient public policy to uphold a retaliatory discharge suit.'
Thus, when determining whether a discharge violates a public policy, courts
have looked to a variety of considerations to determine whether a policy is
violated and if the policy outweighs the employer's interests.'
Several court decisions have discussed the belief that the public's interest
in encouraging corporations to obey the law may outweigh the employer's
interest in keeping control of the workplace. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in
Joiner v. Benton Community Bank, 91 stated that public policy prefers the
exposure of crime and the cooperation of people having information of such
The District Court of Appeals of California, in Petermann v.
crime.'

88. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (IIl. 1981). The court
stated that "it is now recognized that a proper balance must be maintained among the employer's
interest in operating a business efficiently and profitably, the employee's interest in earning a
livelihood, and society's interest in seeing its public policies carried out." Id. at 878. The reason
for requiring this balance is that the term public policy is difficult, if not impossible, to define. See
also 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505: 4.
89. Some courts have also looked to statutory and constitutional rights when determining
whether something is a public policy. See, e.g., Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co., 789 S.W. 2d 538
(Tenn. 1989) (stating that the public policy of Tennessee is to be found in its constitution, statutes,
judicial decisions, and applicable rules of common law). New York's highest court has interpreted
its state whistleblower statute to protect only employees who report violations that endanger public
health or safety. See Remba v. Federation Employment & Guidance Serv., 149 A.2d 131 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989), aft'd, 559 N.E.2d 655, 655-56 (N.Y. 1990). California, on the other hand, has
allowed recovery for plaintiffs who refused to commit unlawful acts that did not necessarily
constitute crimes. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1333-37 (Cal.
1980).
90. Although there is no easy way to determine what is and what is not a clear public policy,
there are some general principles that can help guide the clear mandate analysis. First, the strongest
statements of public policy are those found in statutes or regulations. Courts are more reluctant to
derive public policy from constitutional provisions or judicial decisions. See Vigil v. Arzola, 699
P.2d 613, 616 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd in part on other grounds,687 P.2d 1038 (N.M. 1984).
Second, if a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it probably will not
qualify as a clear mandate of public policy. See Merck v. Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc., 921 F.2d
549, 555-56 (4th Cir. 1990). Third, the public policy at issue does not have to be expressly stated
to be clearly mandated. As one court put it: "Public policy is not concerned with minutiae, but
with principles. Seldom does a single clause of a statute establish public policy; policy is discovered
" Warthen v. Toms River
from a study of the whole statute, or even a group of statutes ...
Community Memorial Hosp., 488 A.2d 229, 232 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (quoting Shaffer
v. Federal Trust Co., 28 A.2d 75, 79 (N.J. Ch. 1942)). Courts will look to these considerations
when determining whether a discharge violates a public policy and when considering if the public
policy outweighs the employer's interest.
91. 411 N.E.2d 229 (11l. 1980). In Joiner,a used car dealer, Joiner, who obtained financing
from the Benton Community Bank was indicted for violating an Illinois statute pertaining to theft,
selling collateral, and willfully failing to pay proceeds to a secured party. Id. at 230-31. Joiner then
brought an action against the bank for malicious prosecution. Id. at 230.
92. Id. at 231.
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InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters," came to a similar conclusion when
it held that the law must encourage truthful testimony." The court concluded
that courts should create every incentive for employees to uphold the law. It
also concluded that by providing employees with an action for whistleblowing,
employees were more likely to uphold the law." The courts in both of these
cases allowed a cause of action, even though none was statutorily granted by
finding that both common law and common sense dictated that the public interest
would be served by offering a remedy to employees discharged for upholding
the law."
The public interest in reducing corporate wrongdoing is not the public's
only interest. The Superior Court of New Jersey, in Parker v. M & T Chems.
Inc. ," held that a public interest also exists in insuring that employees are not
coerced into breaking the law.'
The court stated that by allowing specific
statutory protections, a court's holding should discourage employers from
inducing employees to participate in illegal schemes and should encourage
employees to resist such inducements." If employees were not permitted to
sue for retaliatory discharge, employers could force employees to choose

93. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). In Petermann,the plaintiff, Petermann, was employed
by the defendant union as a business agent. Id. at 26. The defendant hired Petermann and specified
that the duration of employment was as long as Petermann's work was satisfactory. Id. Petermann
was then subpoenaed to testify at a legislative hearing. Id. Petermann alleged that the defendant
instructed him to make certain false statements in his testimony. Id. Petermann, however, gave
truthful answers to all questions asked. Id. The next day Petermann was fired by the defendant.
Id.
94. Id. at 27. The Petermanncourt also stated that the public policy of California required that
every impediment, however remote, must be struck down when encountered. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27-28; Joiner v. Benton Community Bank, 411 N.E.2d 229,
231-32 (111. 1980).
97. 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989). In Parker,the former in-house attorney,
Parker, brought a retaliatory discharge action under New Jersey's Conscientious Employee
Protection Act. Id. at 216, 218. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34: 19-1 to 34: 19-8 (West 1988)
(commonly called the Whistleblower Act). Parker claimed that he was fired because he refused to
copy documents which contained a competitor's trade secrets. Parker, 566 A.2d at 217-18. See

infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text for a more in-depth analysis of the case as related to inhouse counsel.
98. Parker,566 A.2d at 220.
99. Id. The court stated that the decision
compels a retaliating employer to pay damages to an employee-attorney who is
wrongfully discharged or mistreated for refusing to join a scheme to cheat a competitor
or ... for any reason which is violative of law, fraudulent, criminal, or incompatible
with a clear mandate of New Jersey's public policy concerning public health, safety or
welfare. Id.
The court did, however, recognize that it is always open for the employer to show that the discharge
was justified because the employee was fired for "incompetence, disloyalty, reduction in force, or

any other legitimate reason.' Id. at 220.
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between losing their job and violating the law. This has been a justification that
several courts have relied on when deciding whether to allow an employee to
sue for retaliatory discharge."
Several cases have also recognized that the professional codes of ethics can
be a source of public policy sufficient to sustain a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge.'' For example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Pierce v.
Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp.,"0 stated that employees who are professionals
have a special responsibility to follow not only federal and state laws, but also
The court added that
the recognized codes of ethics in their professions."4
this duty may compel them to refuse to perform acts ordered by their
These cases show a general trend in the courts toward
employers." °
recognizing the public policy exception as a basis for employee actions against
their employers.
C. RetaliatoryDischarge Action
The right to sue for retaliatory discharge is an exception to the common law
rule that employees are terminable at-will. 5 Retaliatory discharge is a tort
claim that wrongfully terminated employees can use to sue their ex-employers

100. See Parker v. M & T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989);
Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 113 (III. 1991) (Freeman, J., dissenting).

101. See, e.g., Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 443 A.2d 728,730-31 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div.
1982) (allowing retaliatory discharge suit by pharmacist fired for refusing to violate state regulations
consistent with the code of ethics); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J.
1980); Cisco v. United Parcel Serva., Inc., 476 A.2d 1340, 1343 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (stating that
professional ethics may reflect public policy).
102. 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980). In Pierce, the employee, Pierce, was a medical doctor who
was responsible for research on a new drug. Id. at 506. The research team to which Dr. Pierce
belonged was faced with the question of whether approval should be sought to test the drug on
human subjects. Id. at 507. The entire team initially recommended that the company not seek
approval because of their fear that the drug might cause cancer. Id. The company pressured the
team to change its opinion but when Dr. Pierce refused, she was dismissed. Id. at 507-08. The
court ruled in favor of Pierce because clear issues of public policy were involved, specifically the
safety and health of human subjects with apotentially unsafe drug, and Pierce had both responsibility
for product safety and the training necessary to make judgments about the drug in question. Id. at
512.
103. Id. at 512. The court came to this conclusion based on its belief that a professional code
of ethics can contain expressions of public policy. See id.
104. Id. The Pierce court, however, rejected the employee's argument in this case because the
employee refused to obey her employer based on her personal morals. Id.
105. The first case to recognize this exception was Petermann v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). This exception is actually a subpart of the public
policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine.
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for monetary damages or possible reinstatement." 6 Because barring such an
action would endorse an employer's ability to coerce employees into foregoing
their rights, courts have increasingly recognized this tort when dealing with
general employees. 0 7 Most jurisdictions that recognize the public policy
exception" also recognize retaliatory discharges as applied to general
employees. However, most courts have refused to apply the public policy
exception and the right to sue for retaliatory discharge to in-house counsel. "
The retaliatory discharge cause of action is derived from the public policy
exception to at-will employment and is generally recognized when: (1) an
employer discharges an employee in retaliation for employee activities; and (2)
the discharge contravenes a clearly mandated public policy."' However, the
scope of the retaliatory discharge cause of action is narrower than the public
policy exception in that the employee must be discharged in retaliation for the
employee's activities. The public policy exception only requires that the
discharge oppose a clearly mandated public policy. "'
Retaliatory discharge cases based on the public policy exception fall into
three general categories. In one group of cases, courts have allowed a cause of
action when an employee is fired for exercising statutory or constitutional
rights."' The second category protects employees discharged for refusing to

106. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973) (holding
that firing the plaintiff for filing a workmen's compensation claim was in strict defiance of Indiana's
Workmen's Compensation Act, IND. CODE § 22-3-2-1 (1971), and was a wrongful, unconscionable
act that should be actionable in a court of law); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081,
1088-89 (Wash. 1984) (en bane) (recognizing a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge if the
discharge of the employee contravenes a clear mandate of public policy).
107. See Frampton, 297 N.E.2d at 428.
108. See supra note 19 and accompanying text for a list of states that recognize the public
policy exception.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 129-68.
110. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 881 (Ill. 1981); Balla v.
Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 107 (Ill. 1991); Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins.,
501 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987).
111. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981). This
difference is crucial because an employee suing under the public policy exception need only prove
that the discharge was contrary to public policy, whereas an employee suing under the retaliatory
discharge theory must also prove that the discharge was in retaliation for his or her actions. See
supra text accompanying notes 81-104 for further discussion on the public policy exception.
112. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973). The company,
Central Indiana Gas, discharged an employee after she filed and received a settlement on a workers'
compensation claim. Id. at 426. The Supreme Court of Indiana concluded that
[i]f employers are permitted to penalize employees for filing workmen's compensation
claims, a most important public policy will be undermined. The fear of being
discharged would have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory right.
Employees will not file claims for justly deserved compensation ... [and] the employer
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follow management's directives to violate the law." 3 The third category,
known as whistleblowing, protects employees who are discharged for reporting
the illegal or dangerous practices of their employer. 1 4 In these whistleblower
cases, the courts follow a balancing analysis similar to that used with the public
policy exception."' The courts attempt to balance the employer's reasonable
expectations of employee loyalty against the employee's legitimate concern that
The courts and legislatures
company practice violates public policy." 6
granting this cause of action have concluded that, given the nature of the work
place, such a remedy is necessary to preserve employees' ability to assert their
rights and to promote the interests of the public." 7 The use of the retaliatory
discharge cause of action involving in-house attorneys, however, has not been
readily accepted by the courts and legislators across the country.

is effectively relieved of his obligation. Since the Act embraces such a fundamental.
•.policy, strict employer adherence is required.
Id. at 427. State courts have also protected at-will employees from discharge where the public
policy issue concerned the right to serve on a jury, see, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or.
1975), receive state minimum wages, see, e.g., Montalvo v. Zamora, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1970), and protect pension rights, see, e.g., Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 563 P.2d
54 (Idaho 1977).
113. These cases are generally called refusal cases because the employee refuses to do illegal
activity. See Reynolds, supra note 34, at 559-60. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). The Petermann case concerned an employee who
refused to perjure himself, as his employer had instructed, at a legislative hearing. The court stated
that to force an employee to commit perjury to maintain employment "would . . . encourage
criminal conduct.., and ... serve to contaminate the honest administration of public affairs." Id.
at 27. Other courts have protected at-will employees discharged for refusing to falsify pollution
reports, see, e.g., Trombetta v. Detroit, T & I.R.R., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. 1978), and refusing
to participate in price fixing schemes, see, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330
(Cal. 1980).
114. These cases are generally known as reporting cases. See Reynolds, supra note 34, at 562.
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980), illustrates the issues that typically
confront employees and employers in this third category. For the facts of the Pierce case and the
reasoning of the court, see supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. For whistleblowers to
receive court protection, they must object to company actions which violate a public policy, and the
company must have the responsibility and knowledge to uphold that policy. See, e.g., id.; Geary
v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974).
115. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Klagesv. Sperry Corp., No. 83-3295, 1984WL 49135, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2463 (E.D. Pa. 1984). The court conducted a balancing of the social interest involved between the
plaintiff's and the defendant's actions. Id. at *7. The court decided that the social interest of the
plaintiff's activity greatly outweighed any potential social benefit of the defendant's activity. Id. at
*8. See infra text accompanying notes 179-81 for further discussion of the Kiages case.
117. See Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1979). See also
Abramson, supra note 78, at 285.
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RETALIATORY DISCHARGE SUITS BY IN-HOUSE COUNSEL

Although the doctrine of retaliatory discharge has been expanding to
encompass general employees," ' this expansion has been limited in its
application to attorneys. The tort of retaliatory discharge ordinarily applies to
general employees when a public policy concern outweighs the employer's
normal right to fire an at-will employee." 9 However, cases brought by inhouse counsel do not fit the ordinary retaliatory discharge situation. These cases
involve two conflicting public policies: the employer's compliance with the law
and the client's inherent protection afforded by the attorney-client
and
The lawyer's duties of loyalty,' 2 1 zealousness,'
relationship.'"
confidentiality," for example, protect a client against the lawyer's misuse of
confidential material or disregard of client goals and decisions. These duties of
the attorney minimize the client's inability to oversee and evaluate the lawyer's
The client's right to
specialized abilities and professional judgment.'
terminate the attorney is the fundamental method of guaranteeing that lawyers
successfully perform their duties.
A.

Cases Involving In-House Counsel's Right to Sue

Recently, courts have begun to address the question of whether the modem
exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine also apply to attorneys employed
Most courts, in the
by private corporations such as in-house counsel."

118. See supra text accompanying notes 105-17 for general discussion of the retaliatory
discharge cause of action.
119. See Arthur Sternberg, Preserving Client Trust: The Court Was Right in Balls, 80 ILL. B.J.
281, 281 (June 1992) (quoting Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1978)).
120. See Steinberg, supra note 119, at 281-82.
121. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.7 cmt. 1. Comment 1 of Rule 1.7 states that
"[I]oyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client.' Id.
122. See MODEL CODE, supra note 33, EC 7-1. Ethical Consideration 7-1 states that "[tihe
duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within
the bounds of the law.' Id.
123. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Preamble para. 3. The preamble of the Model Rules
states that "[a] lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a client
except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law." Id.
124. See Sternberg, supra note 119, at 282.
125. Thus far, in-house counsel have brought only 10 reported retaliatory discharge cases. See
App. Ct. 1986), cert.
Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life and Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (111.
denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd
for lack offederaljurisdiction,855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988); McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corp.,
556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 465 N.W.2d 81
(Minn. Ct. App.), rev'd on othergrounds, 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991); Balla v. Gambro, Inc.,
584 N.E.2d 104 (I1. 1991); Michaelson v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991); Parker v. M & T Chems. Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989);
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retaliatory discharge suits brought by in-house counsel, acknowledge the
existence of a public interest in assuring that lawyers follow the Rules of
Professional Responsibility."2 However, not all courts recognize that an inhouse counsel's position as an employee complicates adherence to the Model
Code and the Model Rules and requires the right to sue for retaliatory
discharge." 2 The cases denying a remedy to in-house counsel have also
objected to such suits because they contradict the role of an attorney and might
require disclosure of privileged or confidential information."n
Of the ten cases involving in-house counsel's right to sue for retaliatory
discharge, six have refused to extend the retaliatory discharge cause of action
to the in-house attorney.'
For example, in Herbster v. North American
Company for Life and Health Insurance,'" an Illinois Appellate Court refused
to extend the retaliatory discharge action to in-house attorneys. This refusal
occurred despite the court's acknowledgement that the discharge of the in-house
attorney violated a clearly mandated public policy of insuring the state's interest
in full and complete discovery.'
The court reasoned that the expansion of
the public policy exception to attorneys would seriously impair the mutual trust
between an attorney and client, the attorney's loyalty to the client, the attorneyclient privilege and confidentiality, and the personal employment nature of the
attorney-client relationship. 3 2 Consequently, the Herbster court held that the
tort of retaliatory discharge was not available to an attorney, even if the

Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Klages v. Sperry
Corp., 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2463 (E.D. Pa. 1984); General Dynamics Corp. v. State 1993 WL
225346 (Cal. App. Ct. June 8, 1993), affd sub nom., General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Ct., 876
P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994). See infra text accompanying notes 130-87 for further discussion of these
cases.
126. See, e.g., Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109; Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 346-47; Willy, 647 F. Supp.
at 118; McGonagle, 556 A.2d at 881.
127. See, e.g., Bala, 584 N.E.2d at 107-08; Herbster,501 N.E.2d at 346-47; Willy, 647 F.
Supp. at 118; McGonagle, 556 A.2d at 885; Michaelson, 474 N.W.2d at 178.
128. See, e.g., Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 346-48; Michaelson, 464 N.W.2d at 178; BalLa,.584
N.E.2d at 109.
129. See Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 348; Willy, 647 F. Supp. at 118; McGonagle, 556 A.2d at
885-86; Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 504; Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109-11; Michaelson, 474 N.W.2d at
178.
130. 501 N.E.2d 343 (II. App. Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987). In Herbster,
the plaintiff, formerly in-house counsel to North American Insurance Company, alleged that he was
discharged because he refused to destroy or remove documents from North American's files which
had been requested in a pending lawsuit. Id. at 344. These documents, which were produced by
North American, contained information that would be damaging to the attorney's employer in
pending litigation if made available. Id. When the plaintiff refused to remove the documents he was
discharged by North American. Id.
131. Id, at 344, 348.
132. Id. at 347-48.
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Other courts have
discharge was contradictory to public policy interests.'
also refused to allow retaliatory discharge suits by in-house counsel because of
the damage such suits would cause to the attorney-client relationship.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in Michaelson v. Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Co., ' was one court that refused to allow the in-house
attorney a cause of action because of the potentially adverse effects that would
result to the attorney-client relationship. In Michaelson, the court held that an
attorney cannot properly bring a lawsuit against the client for events that
happened in the course of their attorney-client relationship. 35 The court
reasoned that such conduct would subvert the attorney-client privilege and
interfere with the power to terminate or modify the relationship, which must
The court further reasoned that the evidence
remain with the client. I"
Michaelson submitted was not sufficient to support a retaliatory discharge
claim. 137
Other courts have used the individual state codes of professional
responsibility as a basis for denying retaliatory discharge suits by in-house
counsel. The District Court for the Southern District of Texas, in Willy v.
Coastal Corp.,13' refused to allow in-house counsel a retaliatory discharge

133. Id. at 348.
134. 474 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). In Michaelson, an in-house attorney,
Michaelson, was employed by Minnesota Mining to work in their office of the general counsel. Id.
at 176. Michaelson alleged that Minnesota Mining assured him that if he performed his employment
well, he could work until retirement. Id. Michaelson experienced financial and disciplinary
problems during the early years of his tenure with Minnesota Mining. Minnesota Mining thought
that these problems were reflecting adversely on its corporation and decided to reassign Michaelson
to a new position. Id. at 177. Michaelson took exception to this action and brought contract and
tort causes of action against Minnesota Mining. Id.
135. Id. at 178. The court stated that "[an attorney cannot properly bring a lawsuit against
his client and transform confidential data generated in the course of representation into evidence
against his client." Id.
136. Id. The court further reasoned that since Minnesota Mining could have terminated
Michaelson lawfully, Michaelson's transfer to a new position was well within the client's scope of
authority. Id.
137. Id. at 180-81. The court gave several reasons why Michaelson's retaliatory discharge
claim was insufficient. Id. at 180. First, Michaelson failed to offer any proof of Title VII or Equal
Employment Opportunity law violations by Minnesota Mining. Id. Second, Michaelson never
reported the supposed illegal conduct, but rather gave feedback to his employer regarding proposed
business decisions. Id. Third, the alleged violations were never reported to any outside authority.
Id. Fourth, Michaelson offered no proof that the alleged retaliation was caused by his feedback on
his employer's actions. Id.Fifth, the employer did not fire Michaelson, but simply reassigned him
to a new position. Id.
138. 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'dfor lack offederajurisdiction,855 F.2d 1160
(5th Cir. 1988). In Willy, Willy brought a wrongful discharge action against his former employer,
Coastal Corporation. Id. at 117. Willy was a lawyer who was employed as in-house counsel from
May 1981 until he was fired in October 1984. Id. Willy claimed that he was fired because he
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cause of action on the basis of the state's code of professional responsibility.
The Willy court held that withdrawal from employment, as provided under the
Texas Code of Professional Responsibility,' 39 was a sufficient remedy for an
attorney who does not want to violate the law." 40 The court reasoned that
when an attorney believes that a client is pursuing an unlawful act, the attorney's
only option is to voluntarily withdraw from employment.' 4 If the attorney
decides not to withdraw and does not comply with the client's wishes, it should
be no surprise if the client no longer desires the attorney's services. 42 The
court perceived no reason to distinguish in-house counsel from regular attorneys
when it refused to extend the right to sue for retaliatory discharge to in-house
attorneys.' 43
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Balla v. Gambro, Inc.,' also refused
to extend the retaliatory discharge action to corporate counsel because of the
attorney's code of ethics. 45 The Balla court came to this conclusion even
though it conceded that the attorney was discharged in retaliation for his activity
and in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy in protecting lives and
property.'" The court reasoned that a retaliatory discharge cause of action

insisted that Coastal comply with state and federal environmental and securities laws and because
he would not act in violation of those laws. Id.
139. TEXAS CODE OF PROF. RESP. DR 2-110(B)(4) (1986) (requiring an attorney to withdraw
when discharged by his client); TEXAS CODE OF PROF. RESP. DR 4-101(C)(1) (1986) (requiring an
attorney to withdraw if his client intends to pursue an illegal course of action).
140. Willy, 647 F. Supp. at 118. See also TEXAS CODE OF PROF. RESP. DR 2-1 10(C)(1)(c)
(1986).
141. Willy, 647 F. Supp. at 118.
142. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F.Supp. 116, 118 (S.C. Tex. 1986), rev'dfor lack offederal
juisdiction, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988).
143. Id. See also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Doe v. A. Corp., 709
F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that in-house counsel is subject to the same standards as
a self-employed practitioner).
144. 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991). In Balla, the plaintiff, formerly in-house counsel to Gambro,
Inc., a company that distributed medical equipment, informed the president of the company that a
shipment of defective kidney dialyzers should be kept off the market because it did not meet FDA
regulations. Id. at 106. The president ignored Balla's advice and ordered the defective products
to be shipped from its affiliate company in Germany. Id. at 105-06. Balla reported the violation
to the FDA after he was fired by Gambro, Inc. Id. at 106. The FDA immediately confiscated the
dialyzers and determined that they were in violation of a federal act. Id.
145. The Balla court held that an in-house attorney has no cause of action for retaliatory
discharge. Id. at 107-09.
146. Id. at 107-08. The court reasoned that "[t]he tort of retaliatory discharge is a limited and.
narrow exception to the general rule of at-will employment." Id. at 108. Moreover, "[tihe
foundation of the tort of retaliatory discharge lies in the protection of public policy . . . ." Id.
(quoting Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421.N.E.2d 876, 880 (111.1981)). The court
concluded that "[t]he public policy to be protected, that of protecting the lives and property of
citizens, is adequately safeguarded without extending the tort of retaliatory discharge to in-house
counsel." Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 108.
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was simply not necessary in the case of in-house counsel because the attorney
was ethically obligated to report his employer's wrongdoing under the Illinois
Rules of Professional Conduct.'47 The court also stated that extending
recognition of retaliatory discharge suits to in-house counsel would adversely
affect the attorney-client relationship that exists between the employers and their
in-house counsel." 4
Courts have also looked to state and federal statutes to determine whether
a retaliatory discharge claim should be allowed. One of the courts that refused
to extend the retaliatory discharge cause of action to in-house counsel after
looking at the federal and state statutes was the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Nordling v. Northern States Power Co. 49 The court affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of Nordling's retaliatory discharge claim and stated that there was no
violation of the state's whistleblower statute or any other state or federal
law." 5 However, the court held that the requirements of the attorney-client

147. Id. at 108-09. Balla argued that not extending the tort of retaliatory discharge to in-house
counsel would present attorneys with two possible alternatives: (1) to comply with the clientemployer's wishes and risk both the loss of professional license and exposure to criminal sanctions,
or (2) to decline to comply with the client-employer's wishes and risk the loss of a full time job and
the attendant benefits. Id. at 109. The Balla court disagreed with Balls's characterization of the
situation stating that "[i]n-house counsel do not have a choice of whether to follow their ethical
obligations as attorneys licensed to practice law, or follow the illegal and unethical demands of their
clients .... In-house counsel must abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct." Id. The Balla
court added that in-house attorneys are not like general employees in that in-house attorneys are not
forced to choose between violating the law and losing their job because violating the law is not an
alternative for those bound by the ethical codes. Id.
148. Id. at 109-10. The court stated that the general rule is that the client can discharge his inhouse counsel at any time, with or without cause. Id. This rule recognizes that trust is the basis
of the attorney-client relationship and that the client must have confidence in his attorney in order
to ensure that the relationship will function properly. Id. The court believed that
if in-house counsel are granted the right to sue their employers for retaliatory discharge,
employers might be less willing to be forthright and candid with their in-house counsel.
Employers might be hesitant to turn to their in-house counsel for advice regarding
potentially questionable corporate conduct knowing that their in-house counsel could use
this information in a retaliatory discharge suit.
Id. at 109.
149. 465 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn.
1991). In Nordling, Nordling, an in-house attorney for Northern States Power Co. (NSP), was
informed of a plan to investigate the personal lifestyles of employees at a new company facility. Id.
at 500. Nordling believed that the plan was illegal and reported this fact to the manager of the
project who shelved the plan. Id. Shortly thereafter, the vice president of NSP's law department
discharged Nordling without warning and without following NSP's employee handbook procedure
for dismissing its employees. Id. Nordling then filed suit against NSP and its vice president. Id.
150. Id. at 503-04. The court stated that a retaliatory discharge claim is more likely to involve
the attorney-client relationship than a breach of contract discharge, thereby raising issues of revealing
clients' confidences and wrongdoings. Id. at 504. The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the
court of appeals' decision not to decide the issue of whether the attorney's dismissal fell within the
public policy exception, finding it was unnecessary because the client had an absolute right to fire
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relationship were not compromised, and in-house counsel should not be
prevented from maintaining an action for breach of a contractual provision 5'
contained in an employee handbook.152 Although the Nordling court decided
against allowing the retaliatory discharge action,' 53 this case is nevertheless
important for in-house attorneys because it recognizes a contract based, wrongful
discharge action by an in-house counsel against an employer."5 The case is
also important because it suggests that a retaliatory discharge cause of action for
in-house attorneys could be successful if a federal or state law is violated.' 55
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in McGonagle v. Union Fidelity
Corp., 156 also rejected an in-house counsel's retaliatory discharge claim
because of the federal and state statutes at issue. In McGonagle, the court held
that because the insurance statutes at issue were vague, the in-house attorney
should have deferred to his employer's judgment as to whether the company had
complied with the law. 57 The court reasoned that McGonagle's recited
provisions"s lacked specificity as to what conduct was prohibited. 159 Thus,

its attorneys. Id. at 504. See Nordling, 465 N.W.2d at 85-86 n.1.
151. Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 502. The court granted the in-house attorney a wrongful
discharge claim based on an implied contract theory. See supra note 70 and accompanying text for
further explanation of the implied contract theory.
152. Id. at 502. The court stated that "[t]he fact remains... that the in-house attorney is also
a company employee, and we see no reason to deny the job security aspects of the employeremployee relationship if this can be done without violence to the integrity of the attorney-client
relationship." Id. The court reasoned that the personnel arrangements with in-house counsel differ
from the traditional nature of the self-employed attorney representing a client. Id. The same
administrative personnel supervision is placed over in-house attorneys as other company employees
in matters of compensation, promotion, and tenure. Id.
153. The Nordling court agreed with the trial court's determination that there was no violation
of the whistleblower statute and therefore no need to consider a retaliatory discharge action.
Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 1991).
154. Id. at 503. The court believed that an in-house attorney is essentially an employee like
any other and should be provided the same protection by the law. Id. at 502.
155. Id. at 504. The court stated that "[tihe trouble with Nordling's claim is that he is unable
to identify any federal or state law or rule that was violated or suspected of being violated." Id.
156. 556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). In McGonagle, an in-house attorney, McGonagle,
was informed that the company, Union Fidelity, was not complying with various state insurance
regulations. Id. at 879. McGonagle determined that the policies that were about to be distributed
in Utah did not conform with that state's insurance specifications. Id. McGonagle refused to
authorize the mailings of the policies in Utah, and was subsequently fired from his position at Union
Fidelity. Id. 879-80.
157. Id. at 885.
158. McGonagle based his claim of wrongful termination on several provisions. See 31 PA.
CODE § 122.1 (repealed in 1986); 31 PA. CODE §§ 51.4 to 51.7 (1982); 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 437
(1968); McGonagle, 556 A.2d at 882-83.
159. McGonagle, 556 A.2d at 885. The court stated that unless the employee identifies a
specific expression of public policy violated by his discharge, it will not be labeled as wrongful and
within the sphere of public policy. Id. Broad general statements of public policy violations do not
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the court was left with only McGonagle's opinion that the conduct violated the
state's vague insurance laws, an opinion which was opposed by the corporation's
opinion that the problems were minor in nature and easily reconciled without
contravention of any state insurance requirements.t" The court concluded that
the employer should not be prevented from carrying on its business when a
professional's opinion as to legal or ethical issues is open to question.'
For corporate counsel, the effect of these decisions is twofold. First, they
allow corporate management to coerce in-house attorneys into committing
criminal or unethical acts without fear of being punished by retaliatory discharge
suits. 62 For example, in Balla, the in-house attorney fiercely protested the
sale of defective medical equipment and was fired as a consequence.1"
However, since the in-house attorney was not allowed recovery for retaliatory
discharge, he was essentially punished for his courageous conduct. Similarly,
in Gambro, the corporation escaped punishment for its unscrupulous behavior.
Courts have, in effect, created an environment where in-house attorneys must
decide whether to risk losing their job by resisting their employers' actions or
to keep their jobs by blindly following their companys' orders.
Second, by denying corporate counsel recovery from management, courts
have essentially permitted lawyers to become pawns in effectuating the
obstructions of justice that their employers require."
In Nordling, for
instance, the in-house counsel was ultimately discharged because of his
opposition to illegal surveillance of employees in their homes.'" The lack of
a retaliatory discharge action rendered the attorney's opposition to the
company's surveillance useless. This second effect can also be seen in
McGonagle.'se
McGonagle was fired for his refusal to follow the
corporation's directions to authorize insurance mailings. 6 7 The court's failure
to grant the in-house attorney a cause of action essentially enabled the company
to act without regard to the attorney. The end result of denying in-house

constitute the "clear mandate of public policy which strikes at the heart of a citizen's social right,
duties and responsibilities entitled to the status of nonstatutory cause of action." Id.
. 160. Id. at 885. The court found this to be "a difference of opinion and not a request to have
the plaintiff perform an 'illegal' or unethical act in furtherance of corporate profits." Id.
161. McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d 878, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). The court
did acknowledge, however, that a professional's obligations to his or her professional code of ethics
may conflict with the employer's wishes, and a refusal to violate a more explicit statutory mandate
might justify a retaliatory discharge suit. Id.
162. See Abramson, supra note 78, at 278.
163. See Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 106 (Il. 1991).
164. See Abramson, supra note 78, at 278.
165. See Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 465 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev'd on
other grounds, 478 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Minn. 1991).
166. 556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
167. Id. at 879-80.
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counsel's discharge actions under both the public policy exception and the
retaliatory discharge doctrine is the protection of scoundrel employers who
discharge corporate counsel for upholding both the law and their code of
ethics.'6e
Although these courts have taken a hardline position with in-house
attorneys, other courts have been more willing to recognize retaliatory discharge
actions by in-house counsel against employers. In four other cases, courts have
found that the public policy embodied in the Model Code and the Model Rules
was sufficient to justify retaliatory discharge suits by in-house counsel.re For
example, the Superior Court of New Jersey, in Parker v. M & T Chemicals.
Inc.,1" found that the in-house counsel was an employee within the meaning
of New Jersey's whistleblower statute and held that the statute was not
inconsistent with an in-house counsel's claim for monetary damages in a
retaliatory discharge suit.'
The court reasoned that whistleblower suits are
necessary to preserve the attorney's freedom to refuse to engage in action that
would violate a clear mandate of public policy." 7 The Parker case is an
important precedent for in-house attorneys attempting to bring a retaliatory
discharge cause of action against their employers because the decision recognizes
that in-house attorneys are also employees and thus are covered by general
whistleblower legislation.
The Michigan Court of Appeals, in Mourad v. Automobile Club Insurance
Association,'73 similarly approved a wrongful discharge action by an in-house

168. Balla,.584 N.E.2d at 114 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
169. See Parker v. M & T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989);
Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Klages v. Sperry
Corp., 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2463 (E.D. Pa. 1984); General Dynamics Corp. v. State, 1993 WL
225346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), affid, General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal.
1994).
170. 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989). In Parker,the former in-house attorney,
Parker, brought a retaliatory discharge action under New Jersey's whistleblower statute. Id. at 216,
218. See Conscientious Employee Protection Act, NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 34: 19-1 to 34:19-8 (West
1988). Parker was told by an M & T employee that confidential documents would be delivered to
Parker containing trade secrets of a competitor. Parker,566 A.2d at 217. Parker was instructed
to copy the information. Id. Parker objected to the activity and suggested that the material not be
examined until court approval could be obtained. Id. As a result of Parker's objections, M & T's
President verbally reprimanded Parker and demoted him. Id. at 218. Parker later resigned from
his position because of the demotion. Id.
171. Id. at 222.
172. Id. at 218, 219-21. See also D'Agostino v. Johnson& Johnson, Inc., 542 A.2d 44 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), aff'd, 559 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1989).
173. 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991). In Mourad, the Auto Club's former manager,
Mourad, brought a wrongful discharge action based on breach of a just-cause employment contract
and retaliatory discharge. Id. at 397. The Auto Club's claims director, Mourad's direct supervisor,
decided that Mourad was unable to implement the Auto Club's policies and lacked the administrative
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attorney, although the action was based on a just-cause contract rather than a
whistleblower statute. The Mourad court upheld a judgment in favor of an inhouse attorney who was demoted for refusing to violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility by following unethical and illegal orders. 74 The court reasoned
that Mourad was covered by an implied just-cause employment contract and that
his dismissal violated the contract. 75
The court further reasoned that,
although the Code only binds attorneys, Automobile Club indirectly agreed to
follow the Code by hiring an attorney and promising not to fire him without just
cause. 76 The court also found that the employer waived the right to fire the
attorney at will when they entered into the just-cause employment contract. 177
The first case to recognize the in-house attorney's wrongful discharge cause
of action was Klages v. Sperry Corp. " In Klages, a federal district court
upheld a suit for wrongful discharge by an in-house attorney, Klages. This
decision was based on the public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine. " The court reasoned that the discharge of Klages interfered not
only with his interest in retaining his employment, but also with his interest in
performing his duties as general counsel and as an attorney.'" The court
further reasoned that the suit was necessary to encourage compliance with the

talents necessary to effectively implement cost-containment measures in the legal department. Id.
Mourad was demoted to the position of executive attorney, a position from which he later resigned
before initiating the lawsuit. Id. The attorney asserted that he was demoted when he followed the
Code of Professional Responsibility and refused to comply with unethical and illegal orders. Id.
174. Id. at 397, 403.
175. Id. The court based this finding on the fact that Mourad provided legal as well as
administrative services. Id. at 399-400. Mourad's position as an administrator was confirmed by
the fact that after Mourad was demoted, he was replaced by a nonlawyer. Id. at 400.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 400. The Mourad court declined to address whether an in-house attorney has a
retaliatory discharge cause of action and did not raise the issue of attorney-client privilege or
confidentiality as a bar to the suit. Id.
178. 1984 WL 49135, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2463 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1984). In Kiages, the
plaintiff was employed as vice president and general counsel of Computer Systems, an incorporated
business group within the Sperry Corporation. Id. at *1. As general counsel, Klages was head of
the legal department and entrusted with Computer Systems' compliance with federal and state
security laws. Id. Klages discovered a possible securities violation by the subsidiary's president
and conducted an investigation to determine if these self-dealings truly constituted a securities
violation. Id. Klages reported the potential violation to the general counsel of Sperry Corporation.
Klages was subsequently terminated from employment by the president of Computer Systems. Id.
at *2. Klages claimed that he was discharged in retaliation for his activities in investigating whether
self-dealing by the subsidiary's president constituted a securities violation. Id.
179. Id. at *7.
180. Id. at *8.
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8
securities statutes and with the legal code of ethics.'

The most recent case recognizing the in-house attorney's right to sue for
retaliatory discharge is General Dynamics Corp. v. State. "s In General
Dynamics, the California Court of Appeals held in favor of the in-house
attorney, stating that allowing retaliatory discharge suits promotes objections to,
and reports of, public policy violations by the in-house lawyer." The court
recognized that an attorney is properly subject to regulation due to his role in
society and may be held to a higher standard of ethical conduct in the interest
of protecting the client's and the public's confidence.'" However, the court
added that it did not think that the attorney's status with the public warranted
special treatment since the attorney was also an employee.'

181. Id. at *8. The court balanced the social interests involved between the plaintiff's actions
and the defendant's actions. Id. at *7. The court decided that the social interest of the plaintiff's
activity greatly outweighed any potential social benefit of the defendant's activity. Id. at *8. The
defendant's action of exercising its powers of discharge would suppress the same public interest that
the plaintiff sought to advance. The court also noted that "there is no societal interest in preserving
the ability of the employer to use the discharge power for express purposes of harming the
employee; society demands that the employee be protected from such a course of conduct." Id.
182. 1993 WL 225346 (Cal. Ct. App. June 8, 1993), afid, General Dynamics Corp. v.
Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994). In General Dynamics, the plaintiff, Rose, had been
employed by General Dynamics Corporation for a number of years and during that time had received
regular promotions, salary increases, outstanding performance reviews, and was regularly informed
his job was permanent. 1993 WL 225346 at *1. Rose then reported numerous problems within
General Dynamic's operation to his supervisors. Id. at *1-2.Rose's supervisors were not pleased
that the problems were brought into the public eye. Id. General Dynamics then fired Rose after
an interrogation of the numerous problems. Id. at *2. Rose claimed that his discharge constituted
a wrongful violation of public policy. Id.
183. Id. at * 10. The GeneralDynamics court compared the cases on this issue and agreed with
the Parkerdecision stating that "a rule which makes it safer, as a matter of employment or financial
security, for an in-house lawyer to object to or report violations of public policy, serves the public
interest." Id. The court disagreed with the Balla court's approach in that it would deny attorneys
the rights provided by law to other employees simply because the state has imposed on the attorneyemployee an ethical obligation not shared by general employees. Id.
184. Id. The court further stated that imposition of these ethical duties is one thing; the
deprivation of the attorney's rights as an employee is another. Id.
185. Id. General Dynamics Corporation appealed this decision to the California Supreme
Court. General Dynamics argued that the California Supreme Court's opinion in Fracasse v. Brent,
494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972), governed the present case and that it applied to completely "immunize an
employer from any liability as a consequence of terminating an attorney-employee." General
Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 495 (Cal. 1994). The California Supreme Court
characterized this argument as overbroad and not controlling the issue in question. Id. at 492. In
Fracasse,the court was confronted with a situation involving a private practitioner and his client and
the court concluded that the client had both the right and the power at any time to discharge his
attorney with or without cause. Id. at 492. The court recognized that there were differences
between the Fracassecase and the one at hand. Id at 494-96. The California Supreme Court found
that "the interests and expectations of the parties" involved in an in-house counsel "relationship are
substantially different from those [it had] found determinative in Fracasse." Id. at 495.
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The impact of these four cases allowing the in-house attorney a cause of
action remains uncertain. The indication is that courts are starting to recognize
the need for such suits. In Parker and General Dynamics, the courts reasoned
that the in-house attorney is also an employee and should therefore not be
treated differently from other employees.'" In Mourad, the court used the
just-cause employment contract as a justification for allowing the in-house
attorney a cause of action."s Overall, the courts are struggling with whether
to extend the retaliatory discharge cause of action to in-house counsel. States
need to assist the courts in this endeavor by extending whistleblower statutes to
in-house attorneys.
B.

Remedies Under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and Model
Rules of Professional Conduct

Several courts have held that retaliatory discharge suits by in-house counsel
are not necessary because attorneys must abide by professional ethics and thus
promote the interests of the public."n However, in-house attorneys are in a
different situation than other attorneys. Unlike independent attorneys, in-house
attorneys are faced with questions of who their employer really is and, thus, to
whom their loyalty is owed. An in-house counsel represents the corporate

The California Supreme Court then discussed when the retaliatory discharge cause of action
should be permitted for in-house attorneys. The court stated that "in determining whether an inhouse attorney has a retaliatory discharge claim against his or her employer, a court must first ask
whether the attorney was discharged for following a mandatory ethical obligation prescribed by
professional rule or statute." Id. at 502. If the answer to this is yes, then the attorney would have
a retaliatory discharge cause of action against the employer. "If, on the other hand, the conduct in
which the attorney has engaged is merely ethically permissible, but not required by statute or ethical
code," then the court must resolve two questions to determine if the attorney has a retaliatory
discharge claim against his or her employer. Id. at 503. First, the court must determine "whether
the employer's conduct is of the kind that would give rise to a retaliatory discharge action by a non
attorney employee" and second, "whether some statute or ethical rule ... permits the attorney to
depart from the usual requirement of confidentiality." Id. at 503. The California Supreme Court
limited its decision on this issue to the "conclusion that in-house counsel may state a cause of action
in tort for retaliatory discharge" and remanded the determination of that issue back to the court of
appeals. Id. at 503.
186. See Parker v.M &T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 220 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989);
General Dynamics Corp. v. State, 1993 WL 225346, *10 (Cal. Ct. App. June 8, 1993); General
Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 490 (Cal. 1994).
187. See Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395, 400 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991).
188. See Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life and Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (III. App. Ct.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex.
1986), rev'dfor lack offederaljurisdiction,855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988); Balla v. Gambro, Inc.,
584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill.
1991).
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In
organization which acts only through its duly authorized constituents."
9
complying with Model Rule 1.13, " the attorney must pursue the best interests
of the client-corporation.'"'

The judicial decisions prohibiting retaliatory discharge suits by in-house
counsel have emphasized the adequacy of withdrawal as a remedy for the inWhen a conflict arises between attorney and client, the
house attorney."
Model Rules' and Model Code's recommended remedy is withdrawal.'9
Withdrawal is authorized in a variety of situations and is required when the
situation amounts to a negation of the attorney's professional independence." 9

189. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1. 13. Model Rule 1.13 explains that the in-house
counsel's client is the organization, not the constituents. The rule states that if the attorney knows
that a person affiliated with the organization
intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation
of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might
be imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of
the organization.
MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.13(b).
The Rule also sets out the factors attorneys should consider in determining what is in the best
interest of their corporate client and suggests measures to take such as referring the matter to a
higher authority within the organization. MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.13(b)(1), (2) & (3).
The factors that Model Rule 1.13 provide include: the seriousness of the violation; the consequences
of the violation; the scope and nature of the representation; the responsibility in the organization of
the person involved; the apparent motivation of the person; the policies of the organization
concerning such matters; and any other relevant considerations. MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule
1.13(b).
Rule 1.13 accords with the corporate counsel's fiduciary duty, which is owed to the interests
of the corporation as a whole and not to a single director, stockholder, officer or employee of the
corporation. See Bryan v. Bartlett, 435 F.2d 28, 37 (8h Cir. 1970), cerl. denied, 402 U.S. 915
(1971) (holding that attorneys for a corporation had the same fiduciary duties as the directors of the
corporation); Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that attorneys for
a corporation had the same fiduciary duties as the directors of the corporation); In re Capps, 297
S.E.2d 249 (Ga. 1982) (stating that in-house attorneys owe the organizational client the same duties
outside attorneys owe their clients).
190. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33. Rule 1.13 addresses the attorney's duties and
responsibilities to an organizational client.
191. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.3. Comment One of Rule 1.3 states that "[a]
lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal
inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to
vindicate a client's cause or endeavor." Id.
192. An attorney's withdrawal is the favored remedy and this remedy is described in the
MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.16 (1990), MODEL CODE, supra note 33, DR 2-110, the ABA
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 44, and numerous cases. See, e.g., Balla v. Gambro,
Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 108-09 (Ill. 1991); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116, 118 (S.D.
Tex. 1986). See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at 542-52.
193. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.16(a); MODEL CODE, supra note 33, DR 2110(B). See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 33, § 9.5.3.
194. See Reynolds, supra note 34, at 557.
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Withdrawal remains the standard response to the question of how a lawyer
5
should respond to a client's continuing or proposed wrongdoing. 19
The corporate counsel should first try to convince the employer-client not
to engage in the wrongful conduct."9
If the employer-client insists on
continuing with the wrongful conduct, in-house attorneys, like all other
attorneys, must withdraw from representation if such representation will result
in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or any other law."9 If
attorneys do not abide by this requirement of withdrawal, they face discipline
for violating Model Rule 1. 16(a)(1)' and potential reprimand or disbarment
for violating proper ethical conduct.'99
Withdrawal may be the appropriate and just solution for non-corporate
attorneys.m
However, attorneys with the corporation as their sole client

195. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.16. Comment 2 of Rule 1.16 describes the
circumstances under which mandatory withdrawal is required by the attorney. Id. cmt. 2. It states
"[a] lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the
lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law."
Id.
196. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.16. Rule 1.16 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct is consistent with this suggested course of action for the attorney. Comment 2 of Rule 1.16
states that "[tihe lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggest such
a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be
constrained by a professional obligation."
197. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.16(a); MODEL CODE, supra note 33, DR 2110(B). These rules deal with mandatory withdrawal. The Model Code states that a lawyer must
withdraw from a representation if:
(1) He knows or it is obvious that his client is bringing the legal action, conducting the
defense, or asserting a position in the litigation, or is otherwise having steps taken for
him, merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person.
(2) He knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of
a Disciplinary Rule.
MODEL CODE DR 2-110(B) (1981).
198. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.16(a)(1). Rule 1.16(a)(l) states:
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct
or other law;
Id.
199. See Forrow, supra note 36, at 1799-1802; MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Scope; MODEL
CODE, supra note 33, Preamble and Preliminary Statement, DR 2-110(B), DR 2-110. See also In
re Capps, 297 S.E.2d 249 (Ga. 1982) (holding in-house attorney subject to discipline).
200. Private practitioners may withdraw from representing their client if they abide by the Rules
of Professional Conduct without incurring a total economic loss. The client lost by a private
practitioner is generally one of many, and therefore the economic impact of withdrawal is not very
severe. See generally Kenneth J. Wilbur, Wrongful Discharge of Atorneys: A Cause of Action to
FurherProfessionalResponsibility, 92 DicK. L. REv. 777, 782 (1988).
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have found withdrawal to be difficult and sometimes an unfeasible solution."m
The inadequacies of withdrawal for in-house attorneys stem from the fact that
the corporation is their sole client.'
Thus, in-house counsel are faced with
a dilemma when codes of ethics conflict with the requirements of their
employers. They must choose between maintaining their professional and ethical
obligations and keeping their job.'
Even though the Rules and Code provide that an attorney has a duty not to
participate in a client's unlawful conduct,' the Herbster and Willy courts held
that this policy alone did not justify allowing a cause of action for an in-house
attorney. 5 The Balla court reasoned that because all attorneys, including inhouse, are bound by the Code and Rules not to participate in client misconduct,
retaliatory discharge suits are not needed to encourage in-house attorneys to
behave ethically.'
The Balla court added that in-house attorneys are not like
general employees because in-house attorneys are not forced to choose between
violating the law and losing their job, as violating the law is not an alternative
for those bound by the ethical codes. 7
The court in Herbster held that in-house counsel do not qualify as
employees because they are subject to the codes of professional ethics and

201. Reynolds, supra note 34, at 575 (stating that "[w]ithdrawal is a seriously inadequate option
for company counsel, or indeed, any salaried lawyer who is the full-time, and perhaps long term,
employee of a single client").
202. See infra text accompanying notes 212-16 and 311-15 for further discussion.
203. See Blades, supra note 35, at 1408.
204. See MODEL CODE, supra note 33, DR 7-102(A)(7); MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule

1.2(c).
205. See Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life and Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986), cerr. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex.
1986), rev'dforlack offederaljurisdicdon,855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988). The courts in Herbster
and Willy indicated that withdrawal from representation, the remedy given under the Code and
Rules, was adequate to prevent lawyers from participating in wrongdoing and that a retaliatory suit
by in-house counsel was therefore unnecessary. Herbster,501 N.E.2d at 348, Willy, 647 F. Supp.
at 118.
206. See Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 108-09 (Ill. 1991).
207. Id. The Balla court's attempt to distinguish the general employee's ethical responsibility
from the in-house attorney's is unpersuasive. Following the Balla court's reasoning on this point
to its logical conclusionwould suggest that general employees have no duty or responsibility to obey
the law. This, however, as the Supreme Court found, is simply not true. Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559 (1965). "The law binds all men, and treats kings and paupers alike." See City of Chicago
v. Weiss, 281 N.E.2d 310 (1972) (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965)). The Supreme
Court, in Cox, stated that "[tihere is . . . a plain duty and responsibility on the part of all citizens
to obey all valid laws and regulations." Id. A lawyer should not be punished simply because he
has ethical obligations imposed upon him over and above the universal obligation to obey the law
which all men have. Furthermore, corporate employers should not be protected simply because the
employee it has discharged for "blowing the whistle' happens to be an attorney.
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The Herbster court
therefore do not qualify for retaliatory discharge suits.'
based this conclusion on its view that retaliatory discharge suits evolved to
redress the relative advantage that employers had over their employees.-According to the Herbster court, in-house attorneys have a much stronger
position than ordinary employees because of their access to confidential
information about the company."' Therefore, the Herbster court found that
attorneys can enforce their rights without the court granting them the right to
21
sue. 1

Although some courts have applied the suggested solution 2of
13
withdrawal 12 to in-house attorneys, this solution is simply inadequate.
These courts have failed to consider the differences that exist between the
private practitioner and the in-house attorney when applying the withdrawal
remedy. 214 Withdrawal leaves the attorney without income and with little hope
of obtaining similar employment. 2 5 However, a private practitioner's loss of
a client is not necessarily as serious an economic loss. The private practitioner
usually has many clients, and therefore the economic impact of withdrawal is not
as severe. 2"6 The view that withdrawal is an adequate remedy for in-house
attorneys is not the only obstacle confronting them in attempting retaliatory
discharge suits.
C.

Obstacles to Suits by In-House Counsel

Courts have given several other reasons for not allowing in-house counsel
the right to sue for retaliatory discharge. First, courts have stated that granting

208. Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 346.
209. Id. at 345.
210. Id. at 346-47. Although in-house attorneys do have access to confidential information,
this access is not unique. Non-lawyers also have access to confidential information. See infra text
accompanying notes 282-87 for further discussion of this point.
211. Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 348.
212. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rules 1.16(a); MODEL CODE, supra note 33, DR 2-

110(B).
213. See Reynolds, supra note 34, at 575. There are several cases that have recognized
withdrawal as an adequate remedy for the in-house attorney. See, e.g., Herbster v. North Am. Co.
for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (111.App. Ct. 1986), appealdenied, 508 N.W.2d 728 (II.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex.
1986), rev'dfor lack offederaljurisdiction, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988); Balla v. Gambro, Inc.,
584 N.E.2d 104 (I11.1991).
214. For further discussion of the differences between the private and the in-house attorney,
see infra text accompanying notes 276-81.
215. See Dennis M. Nolan, Note, Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins.:
Attorney's Retaliatory Discharge Action Unjustly Dismissed, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 215, 221
n.44 (1987).
216. See generally Wilbur, supra note 200, at 782. See infra text accompanying notes 311-18
for further discussion of the inadequacies of withdrawal as a solution for in-house attorneys.
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corporate counsel a retaliatory discharge cause of action would be contrary to
the at-will nature of attorney-client employment. 217 Second, courts maintain
that such a cause of action would have an adverse effect on the attorney-client
relationship. 28 Third, courts perceive that the professional rules of ethics
governing all attorneys are an adequate measure in preventing a client's illegal
act. 219 Courts have also opposed suits by in-house counsel because they
threaten the attorney's obligations to promote the client's interests and to
preserve the client's autonomy.22
1. At-Will Nature of the Attorney-Client Relationship
In-house attorneys have a dual relationship with the private corporation."2 1
On the one hand, there exists the attorney-client relationship where it is
recognized that a client may discharge an attorney at any time, with or without
cause.'
On the other hand, an in-house attorney is also considered to be an
at-will employee. As an at-will employee, the attorney would be able to sue his
employer for an alleged wrongful discharge, based on the modem exceptions to
the at-will doctrine.'
Generally though, courts have focused on the first
position, that clients may discharge their attorney at any time, with or without
cause.
Thus, the control of termination of the attorney-client relationship

217. See Herbster,501 N.E.2d at 347; Bala, 584 N.E.2d at 109; Nordling v. Northern States
Power Co., 465 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 478 N.W.2d 498, 501
(Minn. 1991); Anastos v. Chicago Regional Trucking Ass'n., Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1049, 1051 (11.
App. Ct. 1993).
218. See Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 347-48 (111. App.
Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 109 (111.
1991).
219. See Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 346-47; Bala, 584 N.E.2d at 104.
220. See Herbster,501 N.E.2d at 347-48; Nordling, 465 N.W.2d at 86.
221. See Alicia S. Myara, An Attorney's Duty to Advise a Corporate Client Concerning
Computer Software Copying: 7he Ethical Considerations,2 J.L. & TECH. 81, 87 (1987).
222. See Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 347; Bala, 584 N.E.2d at 109; Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at
501; Anastos v. Chicago Regional Trucking Ass'n., Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1049, 1051 (11. App. Ct.
1993). See also 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 168 (1980).
223. See Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 501. The Nordling court stated that "[t]he fact remains
that the in-house attorney is also a company employee." Id. at 502. For further information on
the modern exceptionsto the employment-at-will doctrine, see supra text accompanying notes 68-80.
224. See Herbster,501 N.E.2d at 346-47; Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109; Nordling, 465 N.W.2d
at 86; Anastos, 618 N.E.2d at 1051.
"The employment of an attorney by a client or the attorney-client relationship is revocable by
the client for cause, as in the case of nonperformance by the attorney, failure of the attorney to
prosecute the client's claim with reasonable diligence, or unprofessional conduct of the attorney."
7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 220 (1980). "Moreover, the client has the right to discharge the
attorney and terminate the relation even without cause, as where he is dissatisfied with the services
of the attorney or has lost confidence in the attorney's integrity, judgment, or capacity." Id.
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is in the hands of the clients, such that clients have the absolute right to
discharge their attorney at-will.
2. Attorney-Client Relationship
The principal roadblock preventing retaliatory discharge suits by in-house
counsel has been the concern over the effect such suits would have on the
attorney-client relationship and the perceived adequacy of professional ethics
rules in preventing a client's illegal act.'
It is this attorney-client relationship
that has played a major role in causing many courts to refuse to extend the
retaliatory discharge suits to in-house attorneys.'
There are several factors
that make the attorney-client relationship special. These factors include: the
attorney-client privilege and the confidentiality rule regarding communications
between the attorney and client,2 the fiduciary duty that an attorney owes to
a client, 9 the right of the client to terminate the relationship with or without
cause,z ° and the fact that a client has exclusive control over the subject matter
of the litigation and may dismiss or settle a cause of action regardless of the
attorney's advice."
a. Attorney's Role
As stated above, attorneys have a special role in their relationship with their
clients. 2 The attorney is placed in the unique position of having to maintain
a close relationship with a client in which the attorney obtains secrets,
disclosures, and information that otherwise would not be disclosed even to the
client's most trusted friends. " 3
This position of the attorney has been
considered by the courts in deciding whether to allow an in-house attorney the

225. See supra text accompanying notes 50-80 for further discussion of the employment-at-will
doctrine.
226. See Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 347; Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109; Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at
501; Anastos, 618 N.E.2d at 1051.
227. See Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 347; Bal/a, 584 N.E.2d at 109; Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at
501; Anastos, 618 N.E.2d at 1051.
228. See infra text accompanying notes 240-57.
229. This duty permeates all phases of the attorney-client relationship. Some of the fiduciary
duties of an attorney include: not taking advantage of the client trust and informing the client of all
material facts affecting his employment. See Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 347.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 50-80 for general discussion of the employment-at-will
doctrine.
231. See Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 346-48.
232. "[lrhe basic [purpose] of the attorney-client relationship... is for the attorney to advise
the client as to, exactly, what conduct the law requires so that the client can then comply with that
advice." Ball& v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 113-14 (UIl.1991).
233. See Herbster,501 N.E.2d at 346.
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right to sue.'
Courts have opposed suits by in-house counsel because they threaten the
attorney's obligations to promote the client's interests and to preserve the client's
autonomy. 5 This opposition derives in part from the concern that suits by
in-house counsel would interfere with the client's right to make decisions and
in part from the concern that lawyers should advocate zealously for their clients
rather than for the public interest.'
The Model Rules and Model Code are
consistent with this view in that they describe the role of an attorney as an
advisor, 7 while the ultimate responsibility for decision making rests with the
client.'
Thus, opposition to a cause of action by in-house counsel derives
both from fear that a cause of action would undermine the client's right to make
its own decisions and from the attorney's loyalty to the client. 9

234. Id. at 346-47; Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 108.
235. See Herbster,501 N.E.2d at 347-48; Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 465 N.W.2d
81, 86 (Minn. App. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991). The Herbster
and Nordling courts expressed concern for the client's autonomy. See Herbster,501 N.E.2d at 34448; Nordling, 465 N.W.2d at 86. These courts also opposed the retaliatory discharge cause of
action because it would interfere with the client's ability to discharge their attorney at-will.
Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 344-48, Nordling, 465 N.W.2d at 86. The Nordling court stated that to
interfere with the client's right to terminate would generate such distrust that the attorney would be
unable to serve the client adequately. Nordling, 465 N.W.2d at 86.
236. See Maureen H. Burke, The Duty of Confidentialityand Disclosing CorporateMisconduct,
36 Bus. LAW 239, 265-68 (1981). See also MODEL RuLEs, supra note 33, Preamble par. 2.
237. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 2.1. Rule 2.1 states that "[in representing a
client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral,
economic, social, and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation." Id.
See also MODEL CODE, supra note 33, EC 7-8. EC 7-8 states that:
Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal considerations..
•. In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer
to point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as
legally permissible.
Id.
238. See MODEL CODE, supra note 33, EC 7-8. EC 7-8 states that "[iun the final analysis,
however, the.., decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of nonlegal factors is ultimately for the client." Id. The Model Code further suggests that a suit by inhouse counsel is contrary to a lawyer's duty to promote the interests of her client. See MODEL
CODE, supra note 33, EC 7-1, DR 7-101.
239. See generally Burke, supra note 236. See also Herbster,501 N.E.2d at 347-48. The
Herbster court suggests that, in addition to the question of breach of privilege, a suit by in-house
counsel is contrary to a lawyer's duty to promote the interests of her client. Id. The Herbstercourt
also suggested that lawyers should serve only, or at least primarily, their client's interests, and the
court should not encourage lawyers to assert the rights of the public when they conflict with the
corporation's desired course of action. Id.
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b. Attorney-Client Confidentiality and Privilege
An essential requirement of the attorney-client relationship is that the
lawyer maintain confidentiality of all information regarding the
representation.'
The principle of confidentiality is dealt with in two related
and the rule of conthe attorney-client privilege'
bodies of law:
fidentiality.2 These two concepts are distinct, but both can apply to certain
fact patterns.4 3 Courts believe that suits by in-house counsel encourage
breaches of both the attorney-client privilege and the rule of confidentiality.'
This is based on the belief that the attorney would disclose private information
inthe process of bringing the retaliatory discharge suit."
The attorney-client privilege is defined by the law of evidence and is a right
belonging solely to the client.'
This privilege prevents the disclosure of
information exchanged in confidence between a client and an attorney unless the
client waives the privilege. 7 The attorney-client privilege applies in the

240. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.6 cmt. 4. This principle of maintaining
confidentiality encourages the client "to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to
embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter." Id.
241. The attorney-client privilege, including the work-product doctrine, is a rule of evidence
that prohibits the lawyer from disclosing information communicated by the client to the lawyer in
confidence and relating to representation in judicial or other proceedings. See MODEL RULES, supra
note 33, Rules 1.6 cmt. 5; MODEL CODE, supra note 33, EC 4-1 to 4-4, DR 4-101. See also 8
JOHN H. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292 (John T. McNaughton ed.

1961) (describing when the attorney-client privilege applies); JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCEMANUAL 18.03 (1989) (discussing the attorney-client privilege).
242. The rule of confidentiality is a rule of ethics that applies in situations "other than those
where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law." See MODEL RULES, supra
note 33, Rule 1.6 cmt. 5. The lawyer's duty to keep confidences applies to all information acquired
in the course of representation, regardless of the source. See id.; MODEL CODE, supra note 33, EC
4-1 to 4-6, DR 4-101. See also BROOKE WUNNICKE, ETHICS COMPLIANCE FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS

24-25 (1987) (explaining that confidentiality differs from privilege in that it protects a greater scope
of information).
243. See infra text accompanying notes 246-57 for further discussion of the attorney-client
privilege and confidentiality and the differences between the two.
244. See Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 347-48 (111.App.
Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 109 (11.
1991).
245. See Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 347-48; Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109.
246. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An HistoricalPerspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege,
66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1064-65 (1978).
247. See WOLFRAM, supra note 33, § 6.3. The attorney-client privilege protects only the
narrow right of a client to communicate confidentially with his lawyer about a legal problem.
Specifically "[tihe attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a
lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client.'
MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.6 cmt. 5.
In order to invoke the attorney-client privilege, there are a number of elements that must be
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corporate context when: (1) the communication was part of a corporate purpose
to obtain legal advice; (2) the communication concerned matters within the scope
of the employee's corporate duties; (3) the employee knew that he or she was
making a confidential statement as part of a corporate purpose to secure legal
advice; and (4) the statements were kept confidential or disclosed in a manner
consistent with the privilege.' s The rationale behind the attorney-client
privilege is that it is essential to the attorney's functions as advocate and
confidential advisor to have privileged communications. u9 As an advocate and
an advisor, the attorney can adequately represent the client only if the client is
The attorney-client
free to disclose all information, both good and bad.'
The major exception is
privilege does, however, have several exceptions."
that the privilege will not apply to attorney-client
communications that are made
2
in the furtherance of a crime or fraud.
The scope of the attorney-client confidentiality rule is defined by the

established. See State v. Bulow, 475 A.2d 995, 1004-05 (R.I. 1984). First, the asserted holder of
the privilege is, or sought to become, a client. Id. Second, the person to whom the communication
was made is a member of the bar and, in connection with that communication, is acting as a lawyer.
Id. Third, the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed by his client
without presence of strangers for the purpose of securing primarily either an opinion of law or legal
services or assistance in some legal proceeding and not for the purposes of committing a crime or
tort. Id. Finally, the privilege has been claimed and not waived by the client. Id.
248. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1981). See also GRAHAM C.
LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 2d ed. § 9.9, at 415-16 (West 1987).
249. See Hazard, supra note 246, at 1061.
250. Id. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.6 cmt. 4.
25 1. See Proposed FED. R. EVID. 503(d). These exceptions include: furtherance of a crime
or fraud; claimants through same deceased client; breach of duty by lawyer or client; documents
attested by a lawyer; and joint clients. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.6(b)(2). Rule
1.6(b)(2) specifically allows an attorney to reveal privileged and confidential information to the
extent the attorney reasonably believes necessary:
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the
lawyer and client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations
in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
Id.
252. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 90 (1987) [hereinafter THE LAW
OF LAWYERING]. Communications within the crime-fraud exception are subject to disclosure upon
demand by the court. Id. "[The client forfeits the privilege when he seeks legal advice to advance
an objective that he knew, or should have known, was criminal or fraudulent." LILLY, supra note
248, § 9.9, at 417. A common rationale for this exception is that the privilege should only be used
as a defense to past wrongdoing within an adversary system and not as an aid to future crime. See
WOLFRAM, supra note 33, § 6.4, at 279 n.44.
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professional rules of ethics. 3 The rule of confidentiality is broader than the
attorney-client privilege. Confidentiality applies to all information about a
client, not merely information received directly from the client.'5
In other
words, privileged information is a subset of that which is confidential.
There are several justifications for the rule of mandatory confidentiality.
First, the rule discourages attorney abuse of client information by providing for
professional disciplinary measures.2 5
Second, mandatory confidentiality
provides an additional safeguard to the attorney-client privilege when there is
doubt as to whether the information is privileged.'
Finally, the rule
incorporates the general law of agency, imposing duties on agents to keep
information about their principals confidential."l The Model Rules and Model
Code, however, both provide an exception to the confidentiality rule.'
Under the Model Code and Model Rules, an attorney may disclose confidential

253. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.6 cmt. 5. See also WOLFRAM, supra note 33,
§ 6.7, at 296. The most influential rules are the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules), which have been adopted in some form in 35 states. See THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra
note 252, § AP4: 101, app. at 1255. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code),
predecessor to the Model Rules, is followed in some states that have not adopted the Model Rules.
See id. at n. 1. The states that follow the Model Code are Massachusetts, Oregon, Virginia, and
New York. Id. Both sets of rules prohibit disclosure by an attorney of all information about a
client, regardless of when and from whom the information was obtained. See WOLFRAM, supra note
33, at 296.
254. See THE LAW OF LAWYERINO, supra note 252, at 90.2. The rule of confidentiality
basically amounts to mandatory confidentiality. Model Rule 1.6, in comment 5, states that "[t]he
confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also
to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source." See MODEL RULES, supra
note 33, Rule 1.6 cmt. 5.
255. See WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at 300.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 299-300. The Restatement (Second) of Agency describes agency as "the fiduciary
relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall
act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). Attorneys are also held to be in an agency relationship with their
clients. Id. § le. For further information on the confidentiality of the agency relationship see
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 281a, 381e, 395(d) cmt. j (1958).
258. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 33, Rule 1.6 cmta. 9-13. The Model Rules permit
disclosure of confidential information to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary
"to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm." See MODEL RULE , supra note 33, Rule 1.6(b)(1).
The Model Code's exception is broader than that of the Model Rules and allows a lawyer to reveal
"[t]he intention of [the] client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime." MODEL CODE, supra note 33, DR 4-101(c)(3). See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule
1.6(b)(2).
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information when the respective exceptions apply.'
These exceptions to the
attorney-client privilege and confidentiality rule can be used as a basis for
allowing retaliatory discharge suits by in-house counsel.' ° In addition, the
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege and confidentiality rule should be used
because of the new role in-house attorneys have obtained in modem society.
D.

Need for Change in Attitudes Toward In-House Counsel

There exists a growing need for granting in-house attorneys the right to sue
for retaliatory discharge. This need has grown as more and more corporations
continue to develop their own internal legal departments."6
The main
motivation for the development of legal departments in corporations is based

259. Thus, an attorney is permitted to disclose confidential information but is not required to
do so. Nine states have adopted more restrictive confidentiality roles requiring attorneys to report
such information about future crimes, on penalty of disbarment for failing to do so. States that have
adopted mandatory disclosure rules are Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, Nevada,
North Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See THE LAW OF AWYERJNO, supra note 252, § AP4104, app. at 1262 n.2.
260. The furtherance of a crime or fraud and the Rule 1.6(b)(2) exceptions should apply to inhouse attorneys when they reveal confidential and privileged information in their attempt to prove
a retaliatory discharge claim. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.6(b)(2). Rule 1.6(b)(2)
allows an attorney to reveal confidential information to the extent the lawyer believes reasonably
necessary:

(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
Id.
The in-house attorney should be able to reveal confidential information to establish a defense
in a retaliatory discharge controversy between the lawyer and the corporation. Denying the in-house
attorney the use of this confidentiality exception in retaliatory discharge situations would not only
contradict the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, but it would also, in effect, take a potential
course of action for the attorney and give it to the employer as a way to avoid such suits. See infra
notes 308-11, 413-15 and accompanying text for further discussion on how these exceptions can be
used as a justification for allowing retaliatory discharge suits by in-house attorneys.
261. See Fisher, supra note 31, at 185. Fisher's article addresses the problem of high legal
costs to corporations. She suggests several methods for corporations to address this problem
including: using in-house counsel whenever possible instead of an outside firm; demanding itemized
billings of outside firms and scrutinizing them; asking firms to submit bids for carefully described
tasks; knowing exactly what services are being purchased; investing in computers; and avoiding
litigation altogether. Id. See also STEVENS, supra note 30, at 7-9. Stevens describes the emerging
importance of corporate counsel in the following way:
In the new scheme of things, the corporate counsel would earn his stripes not by
coddling the outside firms, but by reducing their fees, by shifting more and more of the

workload in-house, and by severing relationships built on old school ties in favor of
those based on legal expertise and sound economics.
Id. at9.
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strictly on economics.'
Corporations are concerned and outraged with the
skyrocketing costs of using outside law firms for their legal problems.' 3 This
has led many corporations, in an attempt to cut costs, to develop their own legal
departments within the corporation.'
This expansion of corporate legal
departments and in-house attorneys increases the need to establish some form of
protection for the growing number of in-house attorneys who may be placed in
difficult positions by their corporate employers.
The in-house counsel is put in a uniquely difficult position when an
employer discloses a future illegal or unethical act to the attorney, or requests
that the counsel participate in such an act. Unlike a private practitioner, an inhouse attorney can be both an employee of, and an attorney for, the
company.'
In-house attorneys also depend solely on that employer-client for
their livelihood. 2' Attorneys put in this position have a difficult choice to
make. They can report the illegal activity and then expect to be fired, as the
Model Rules, 7 Model Code,'
and several cases suggest; 2' or, they can
violate the Model Rules and Model Code and keep their job, but risk reprimand
or disbarment."
Although every attorney is expected to choose the first
alternative, in practice, this would be a difficult choice for many to make. The
dilemma could be alleviated if a legal avenue was available to allow a cause of

262. See Kuzela, supra note 31, at 43. Traditional corporations accepted the idea that
controlling the legal costs of outside law firms was impossible. Id. This view is changing, and now
legal managers are trying to find the most economical way to get their legal work completed. Id.
263. Fisher, supra note 31, at 185. Law firms made about $52 billion in 1985, while in 1990,
the totals were around $90 billion. Id. See also Kuzela, supra note 31, at 43.
264. See Kuzela, supra note 31, at 43; Fisher, supra note 31, at 185. Fisher states that inhouse counsel costs about 40 % less than using outside firms. Id.
265. See General Dynamics Corp. v. State, 1993 WL 225346, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. June 8,
1993). The General Dynamics court stated that "we do not think that the attorney's status...
justifies treating him differently than other employees where his status is clearly that of an
employee." Id. at *9. See also Parker v. M & T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 220 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1989). The Parker court extended the state's general whistleblower protection act
to in-house attorneys. Id. The court stated that "[ojur affirmance here and our construction of the
Act compels a retaliating employer to pay damages to an employee-attorney who was wrongfully
discharged." Id. See also Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 465 N.W.2d 81, 87 (Minn. Ct.
App.) (Kalitowski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd on othergrounds, 478 N.W.
2d 498 (Minn. 1991). Judge Kalitowski described the in-house counsel relationship with the
corporation as "dual in nature: the relationship is one of attorney-client as well as of employeremployee." Id.
266. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 278-81 for further discussion.
267. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 33, Rule 1.2 cmts. 6-9, Rule 1.6 cmts. 9-16.
268. MODEL CODE, supra note 33, EC 7-7.
269. See Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (I11.1991); Herbster v. North Am. Co. for
Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (111.App. Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987).
270. See Forrow, supra note 36, at 1802-03; MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Scope; MODEL
CODE, supra note 33, Preamble and Preliminary Statement, DR 2-110. See also In re Capps, 297
S.E.2d 249 (Ga. 1982) (holding in-house attorney subject to discipline).
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action for attorneys confronted with such a situation.
E.

Reasons for Adopting the Retaliatory Discharge Exception for In-House
Counsel

There are numerous reasons for extending the retaliatory discharge
exception to in-house attorneys. First, in-house counsel are in a similar
employment position as general employees and should be afforded equivalent
protection."' Second, corporate counsel should be rewarded for their ethical
behavior and should not, as some cases have required, be punished.'m Third,
allowing retaliatory discharge suits by in-house counsel will not impair the
existing attorney-client
relationship. 3
Fourth, the confidential
communications between the corporate attorney and the client will also not be
damaged by allowing such suits.' 4 Finally, the present remedies offered by
the Model Rules and Model Code provide an inadequate solution.' 5
1.

In-House Counsel Should be Afforded Protection Equivalent to General
Employees

By dismissing in-house attorneys' suits as unnecessary, the courts have
rejected strong arguments concerning how in-house attorneys are in a similar
position as general employees.' 6 In-house counsel are just as susceptible to
employer coercion as general employees, and therefore, they should be entitled
to the same rights as general employees.' m There are several considerations
that illustrate the similarities between in-house counsel and general employees.
First, in-house attorneys' relationships to their employers are the same as other
employees' relationships.S In-house attorneys are dependent on their client-

271. See infra text accompanying notes 276-86.
272. See infra text accompanying notes 288-94.
273. See infra text accompanying notes 295-300.
274. See infra text accompanying notes 301-10.
275. See infra text accompanying notes 311-18.
276. See, e.g., Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 346-47
(l1. App. Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Nordling v. Northern States Power Co.,
465 N.W.2d 81, 86 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991).
277. See Parker v. M & T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 220 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989);
General Dynamics Corp. v. State, 1993 WL 225346, *10 (Cal. Ct. App. June 8, 1993); General
Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 489-92 (Cal. 1994).
278. See General Dynamics Corp., 1993 Wi. at *10; General Dynamics Corp., 876 P.2d at
489-92; Parker, 566 A.2d at 220; Nordling, 465 N.W.2d at 87.
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They are covered
employer for their sole income, benefits, and pensions."
by employee handbooks and personnel policies, and they are subject to
company-controlled salary levels and promotions.' ° Furthermore, like all
other employees of a company, in-house counsel are expected to further
company objectives. These similarities suggest that in-house attorneys should
be either considered to fall within the definition of employee for statutory and
common-law causes of action for retaliatory discharge,"' or given a separate
cause of action.
Second, it is not clear that in-house attorneys are in a more powerful
In-house counsel's access to
position than other general employees.M
confidential information is by no means unique. Non-lawyers also have access
to extremely sensitive and important information. 3 This fact underlies the
existing whistleblower statutes which encourage reporting by employees.'

279. In-house attorneys serve only one client-employer just as the general employees. The inhouse attorney is unlike the private practitioner who generally has many clients and where the loss
of one client would not be as severe an economic impact. The in-house counsel generally do not
enjoy such diversity of clients. See Wilbur, supra note 200, at 777. The Supreme Court of
California stated in a recent case that "[t]he complete economic dependence of in-house attorneys
on their employers is indistinguishable from that of nonattorney employees who are entitled to
pursue a retaliatory discharge remedy." GeneralDynamics Corp., 876 P.2d at 490.
280. See Nordling, 465 N.W.2d at 87 (Kalitowski, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
The situation of an in-house counsel is not the same as a private attorney. A key difference is in
the fact that the private attorney controls the focus and nature of his or her practice and may decline
to represent certain clients. Id. The in-house attorney, on the other hand, is subject to control of
his or her only client, the corporation. Id. The corporation controls the lawyer's salary, hours, and
the focus of the in-house counsel's practice. Id.
281. The Parkercourt came to such a conclusion when it extended New Jersey's whistleblower
act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34: 19-1 to 34: 19-8 (West 1986), to an in-house attorney. See Parker,
566 A.2d at 220.
282. See Louis C. Friedman, Should CaliforniaHouse Counsel Be Allowed to Claim Wrongful
Termination?, 14 W. ST. UNIV. L. REv. 431, 437-39 (1987).
1981). The
283. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Ill.
Palmateer court stated that "[p]ublic policy favors [employee's] conduct in volunteering information
to the law-enforcement agency." Id. The existence of this public policy strongly suggests that
general employees also have access to sensitive information. See also ALAN F. WESTIN,
CONCLUSION TO WHISTLE BLOWING! LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 133 (1981).

Westin discusses the significant role general employees can play in protecting society from
corporations. Id. He maintains that, given the harm corporations may cause to the public,
"[g]reater internal-dissent and error-detection procedures" are needed. Id. See also Nordling, 465
N.W.2d at 88 (Kalitowski, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Kalitowski stated that
the information disclosed by in-house counsel might be no more damaging than if other high-level
employees sued. Id. All of these sources indicate that general employees should also have access
to sensitive and important information.
284. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34: 19-3 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994), which provides, in
part, that:
An employer shall not take any retaliatory action against an employee because the
employee does any of the following:
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5
The majority of courts, however, have failed to recognize these similarities.?
This places the in-house attorney at a major disadvantage because, unlike other
employees, attorneys are bound by ethical codes and rules prohibiting the
s
Therefore,
disclosure of information obtained from their client-employer.'
in-house attorneys are left without a remedy while they are at least as vulnerable
as other middle and senior level managers who have standing to sue.' s

2.

Corporate Counsel Should Be Rewarded and Not Punished for Their Ethical
Behavior

Allowing retaliatory discharge suits by in-house attorneys would encourage
ethical behavior by corporate counsel in several ways. First, it would protect
honest lawyers and punish dishonest employers.' m Employers who force
lawyers to choose between ethical activity and future employment should be
punished. Permitting actions for retaliatory discharge would protect lawyers

a. Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a superior or to a public body an activity,
policy or practice of the employer or another employer, with whom there is a business
relationship, that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of a law, or a rule or
regulation promulgated pursuant to law.
Id.
The language of this section of the New Jersey statute suggests that the employee would be
disclosing some sort of sensitive or important information. If the information disclosed by the
employees in these situations were not sensitive or important, then there would be no need to protect
the employees when they disclose it. See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833 (West 1988);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 15.362 (West 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West 1987).
285. See Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343,346-47 (111. App.
Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex.
1986), rev'dfor lack of federal jurisdiction, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988), affid, 503 U.S. 131
(1992); McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Nordling, 465
N.W.2d at 81; Balls v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991); Michaelson v. Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). See supra text accompanying notes 125-87
for further discussion of these cases.
286. See Herbster,501 N.E.2d at 346-47 (discussing attorneys' duty of confidentiality).
287. If courts would recognize the fact that sensitive information is disclosed by both in-house
counsel and by general employees, then in-house attorneys would be able to use the existing
whistleblower statutes in actions for retaliatory discharge. But since most courts have not recognized
this, in-house counsel have been left with no remedy. See Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life &
Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (111.App. Ct. 1986); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.
Tex. 1988); McGonsgle v. Union Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Nordling
v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d
104 (111.1991); Michaelson v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg.. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991).
288. See Michael L. Closen & Mark E. Wojcik, Lawyers Out in the Cold, 73 A.B.A. J., Nov.
1987. at 96. "If an employer tells his lawyer to do something unlawful, the lawyer should be
encouraged ... to refuse to do so. If the employer persists, [the employer is] willfully trying to
break the law and should not be insulated from a retaliation-discharge suit if he fires an honest

lawyer." Id.
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who comply with professional rules of conduct and other clear public
policies.'8 9 Allowing retaliatory discharge suits would further encourage
reporting by those attorneys who would not have otherwise reported their
employer's wrongdoing.
Leaving lawyers singularly unprotected for abiding by their ethical
responsibilities endangers not only the individual in-house counsel, but also the
legal profession as a whole.'
As professionals, lawyers are entrusted with
the public confidence and are required by state licensing programs and their own
professional codes to use their unique expertise for the greater good of the
public."
By providing an exception to the at-will employment doctrine for
in-house attorneys, courts would protect corporate counsel from the economic
risks of serving only one client and encourage in-house lawyers to act ethically
in the face of employer pressure to do otherwise. This ethical behavior is
needed to ensure society's faith and trust in the legal system.
Furthermore, there is nothing unique about lawyers' responsibility to follow
their ethical rules, and there is also a strong argument that attorneys should be
rewarded for following the professional ethics rules that further public
policy.'
To say that the force of the ethical obligations imposed on lawyers
is enough to ensure that the obligations will be fulfilled clearly ignores

289. See Stephen E. Kalish, The Attorney's Role in the Private Organization,59 NEB. L. RELv.

1,2(1980).
290. Alan 0. Amos, Protecting the Wrongdoer Instead of the Watchdog: The Court Was
Wrong in Balla, 80 ILL. B.J. 281, 283 (June 1992).
291. See Alfred G. Feliu, Discharge of Professional Employees: Protecting Against Dismissal
for Acts Within a Professional Code of Ethics, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 149, 165 (1979).
See also Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). In Schware, Justice Frankfurter described the character needed among lawyers in the
following way:
[A lawyer] stands as a 'shield' .
in defense of right and to ward off wrong. From
a profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of
trth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance
of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries been compendiously
described as 'moral character'.
Id.
292. Amos, supra note 290, at 283, 301. The Amos article discusses a New Jersey case,
Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 443 A.2d 728 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982), in which a
pharmacist who objected to his employer's wrongful activity "was found to have a stronger, rather

than a weaker, case for retaliatory discharge based upon the consonance of the Code of Ethics of
the American Pharmaceutical Association." Amos, supra note 290, at 301. It would, therefore,
seem consistent for courts to recognize the Professional Code of Ethics, which binds all attorneys,
as a justification supporting retaliatory discharge suits by in-house counsel.
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One would like to believe that lawyers will always do the right
reality.'
thing because the law requires lawyers to act ethically. However, one cannot
deceive oneself into thinking that the ethical duties' of lawyers will ensure
that all attorneys will act appropriately. An incentive is necessary to ensure that
attorneys will feel free to follow their ethical duties. The retaliatory discharge
cause of action is the incentive that will allow in-house attorneys to act ethically
and expose the illegal actions of their employer.
3.

Retaliatory Discharge Suits by In-house Counsel Will Not Impair the
Attorney-Client Relationship

Courts have argued that allowing an in-house attorney a cause of action for
retaliatory discharge would discourage corporate clients from communicating
with the attorney and would have a chilling effect on the attorney-client
However, recognition of the retaliatory discharge action will
relationship.'
not further impair the existing attorney-client relationship or discourage
communication. First, the arguments made by courts against the retaliatory
discharge action by in-house attorneys are inherently flawed. These arguments
presuppose that an employer would discharge the in-house counsel -if the
attorney disagrees with questionable conduct. Normally, corporations seek
advice from in-house counsel to avoid, rather than to commit, illegal activities
in their business conduct. ' Corporate employers that seek legal counsel for
the purpose of avoiding illegal acts would thus be receptive to the in-house
counsel's advice. It is only the companies that seek to engage in illegal
activities that would ignore the in-house counsel's advice.'
Second, an in-house attorney's reporting of a clearly illegal act by a

293. See Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 113-14 (111. 1991) (Freeman, J., dissenting).
"Specifically, it ignores that, as unfortunate for society as it may be, attorneys are no less human
than non-attorneys and, thus, no less given to the temptation to either ignore or rationalize away
their ethical obligations when complying therewith may render them unable to feed and support their
families." Id. at 113.
294. An example of the ethical duty is the obligation to withdraw from representing a client
when that "representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law."
MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.16(a)(1). See also MODEL CODE, supra note 33, DR 2110(B).
295. See Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 346 (111.App.
Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Balls v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 109 (111.
1991).
296. See Bala, 584 N.E.2d at 114. Justice Freeman, in his dissenting opinion, stated that the
"court is entitled to assume that corporate clients will rarely" decide to act in a particular manner
regardless of advice that such conduct is contrary to law. Id.
297. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 114 (Freeman, J., dissenting) ("mo allow a corporate employer to
discharge its in-house counsel under such circumstances, without fear of any sanction, is truly to
give the assistance and protection of the courts to scoundrels.").
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corporate officer may have no more of an adverse impact on attorney-client
communication than when the counsel seeks a reversal of a decision to engage
in illegal conduct by resorting to higher authorities within the organization. In
the corporate relationship, the in-house counsel serves the corporate organization
and not the corporate officers.'
Thus, when a corporate officer contemplates
an illegal act, it is the in-house counsel's duty to prevent that conduct because
it is damaging to the corporation, even if this means opposing an officer's illegal
conduct or resorting to higher authorities within the corporation. 9
By
bringing the illegal acts of corporate officers to the corporation's attention, the
corporate counsel is acting in the best interest of the client, the corporation.
Allowing in-house attorneys to sue for retaliatory discharge would only chill the
attorney-client relationship and discourage free communication between the
attorney and corporate client where the employer decides to proceed with the
particular conduct, regardless of the attorney's advice that the conduct
contradicts the law.'
4.

The Confidential Communications Between the Corporate Attorney and the
Client Will Not Be Damaged

Another justification for allowing the retaliatory discharge action is that it
does not damage the sanctity of the confidential communications between the
corporate lawyer and the client. Both the evidentiary privilege 3 ' and the
ethical duty of confidentiality' contain an exception in cases where a lawyer's
services are sought in furtherance of a crime. 3
The policy behind the
attorney-client privilege is to enhance the administration of justice. It would be
a deviation from this policy to extend these privileges to a client who seeks
advice in furtherance of a criminal or unethical scheme.3
Some courts have stated that the tort of retaliatory discharge would chill
communications between lawyer and client as well as diminish general trust

298. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.13; WOLFRAM, supra note 33, § 13.7.2, at 735.
299. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 33, Rule 1.13(b). See also WOLFRAM, supra note 33, §
13.7.5, at 744. The duty of the in-house attorney to prevent illegal conduct goes to the essence of

the attorney-client relationship. "One of the basic purposes of the attorney-client relationship,
especially in the corporate client-in-house counsel setting, is for the attorney to advise the client as
to, exactly, what conduct the law requires so that the client can then comply with that advice."
Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 113-14 (Freeman, J., dissenting).

300. See Baila v. Grambo, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 114 (flI. 1991) (Freeman, J., dissenting).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 240-60 for further discussion of attorney-client
privilege.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 240-60 for further discussion of attorney-client
confidentiality.
303. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.6; FED R. EVID. 502 (1990).
304. See C. MCCOEMICK, MCCORNMxCK ON EVIDENCE § 95, at 229 (3d ed. 1984).
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between them. 5 However, at the heart of the evidentiary and ethical
privileges is the realization that in certain instances, competing interests will
outweigh the interest of confidentiality. Consequently, there are crime and fraud
The argument that retaliatory
exceptions to the evidentiary privilege.'
discharge would have a chilling effect is further undermined by the basic notion
that clients have no right to expect the assistance of counsel in certain kinds of
activities.'0 .
Confidentiality exceptions also exist for controversies between lawyer and
The confidentiality
client under both the evidentiary and ethical privileges.'
exceptions found in Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) should apply to in-house attorneys
when they reveal confidential and privileged information in their attempt to
Although none of the retaliatory discharge
prove retaliatory discharge.'
cases involving in-house counsel have applied or acknowledged this exception,
the logic behind its application to the in-house counsel is sound. The in-house
attorney should be able to reveal confidential information in the retaliatory
discharge controversy between the lawyer and the corporation in the attorney's

305. See, e.g., Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 346 (11.
App. Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Balla v. Ganbro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 109
(111.1991); Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 465 N.W.2d 81, 85 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev'd
on other grounds, 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991).
306. See UNIF. R. EvlD. 502(d)(1) (1974). The fraud exception is based on the idea that the
attorney-client privilege should only be used as a defense to past wrongdoing within the adversary
system and not as an aid to fraudulent acts. See WOLFRAM,supra note 33, § 6.4.10, at 279 n.44;
MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.6(b)(l). The crime exception allows an attorney to disclose
confidential information when the attorney reasonably believes that the disclosure is necessary "to
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm." Id.
307. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.2(d). Rule 1.2(d) states that:
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences
of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to
make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the
law.
Id.
308. See UNIF. R. EVlD. 502(d)(3) (1974). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct have also
allowed several exceptions to the attorney-client privilege and confidentiality. See MODEL RULES,
supra note 33, Rule 1.6(b)(2). For the text of Rule 1.6(b)(2), see infra note 309.
309. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.6(b)(l), 1.6(b)(2). Rule 1.6(b)(2) allows an
attorney to reveal confidential information to the extent the lawyer believes reasonably necessary:
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to
allegation in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
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own defense.31
Because the in-house attorneys would be revealing the
confidential information in defense of themselves in such a situation, the Rule
1.6(b)(2) defense exception should apply. This would eliminate concerns about
whether the material was confidential or privileged. Therefore, allowing the
disclosure of confidential information in retaliatory discharge suits would not
have a chilling effect on the communications between the client and attorney.

5.

The Existing Remedies Offered by the Model Rules and Code Are
Insufficient

The solution offered by the Model Rules" and the Model Code 3 2 -an
attorney's withdrawal-is neither a satisfying nor an adequate solution.313
When presented with an employer's plan to act criminally or unethically, a
corporate counsel may resign, comply, or refuse to comply and face discharge.
As an attorney's mobility declines, 3 4 withdrawal, as well as dismissal, leave
the attorney without income and with little chance of obtaining similar
employment in the near future."' If afforded recovery through retaliatory
discharge actions, these in-house attorneys would be compensated for their
misfortune. This compensation would support the unemployed counsel during
their search for other employment while, at the same time, promote ethical
conduct.
The justifications that courts have given for denying the in-house attorney
the right to sue for retaliatory discharge are not persuasive. Corporate attorneys
are not like private attorneys as some courts have suggested. Rather, in-house
attorneys are more like the general corporate employee than the private
practitioner. 31 6
The attorney-client relationship and the principles of
confidentiality and privilege are not impaired by allowing in-house attorneys a
cause of action. 317 Further, the present remedy offered by the Model Rules

310. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.6(b)(2). This application of Rule 1.6(b)(2)
comes directly from the Model Rule itself. See supra note 309 for the text of Rule 1.6(b)(2).
311. MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.16(a).
312. MODEL CODE, supra note 33, DR 2-110(B).
313. See Reynolds, supra note 34, at 575.
314. See Abramson, supra note 78, at 275. Abramson states that "in reality, attorneys have
a much harder time finding positions in the job market" than some cases suggest. Id. For example,
the in-house attorney fired in Herbster did not find another job until five months after he was
terminated. Id. at 276.
315. See Nolan, supra note 215, at 221 n.44 (quoting NATIONAL ASS'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT,
INC., CLASS OF 1983 EMPLOYMENT REPORT AND SALARY SURVEY (10th ed. 1985)) ("[Dlespite the

glowing nature of a 90.6% employment rate, .. . jobs remain hard to get for the most part, even
at the most well known law schools in the country.").
316. See supra text accompanying notes 276-87.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 295-310.
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38
and Model Code, an attorney's withdrawal, is not an adequate solution.
Therefore, the in-house attorney should be allowed the opportunity to sue for
retaliatory discharge.

IV.

STATUTORY PROTECTION FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS

The federal and state statutory trend is toward greater protection for
whistleblowers against the retaliatory acts of their employers.319 There is a
great amount of statutory protection afforded to whistleblowers. However, this
protection is limited in who may assert it. At the federal level, anti-retaliation
provisions in numerous civil rights laws and labor laws protect whistleblowers
who exercise specific rights granted under these statutes. 3' 2 In addition, the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act
of 1989 have been developed to provide further protection to the federal civil
servant who "blows the whistle." 32' Additionally, laws have been enacted at
the state level which are designed to protect whistleblowers.
The protection
afforded to whistleblowers by these federal and state statutes is examined below.
A.

Federal Whistleblower Protection

At the federal level, the protection afforded to whistleblowers can be
classified into four categories. First, a variety of federal statutes contain
provisions protecting employees who exercise their rights and obligations as
required under these specific statutes. 3'
All employees working for
organizations covered by the statutes receive this protection.'
Second, the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution provide

318. See supra text accompanying notes 212-16, 311-17.
319. This section provides a brief overview of the federal and state statutory whistleblower
protection and is not intended to be a detailed and inclusive coverage of all the statutory protection.
320. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 198, §§ 151-169, 49 Stat.
449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)); Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1988); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)
(1988); Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (1988); Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988); Surface Transportation Assistance Act of
1982, 49 U.S.C. § 2305 (1988). See generally Kohn, supra note 20, at 99.
321. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 2302; Whistleblower Protection Act
of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. 1 1990). See infra text accompanying notes 343-54 for further
discussion of these Acts.
322. See supra note 20 and accompanying text for a list of states that have enacted
whistleblower statutes.
323. See, e.g., Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (1988); Clean
Air Act of 1955, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1988); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851
(1988).
324. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a); Water
Pollution Control Act of 1948, 33 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (1972).
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some protection to whistleblowers.3
Third, under certain circumstances,
whistleblowing activity is protected by provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).'
Fourth, most federal employees who "blow the
whistle" on their employer receive the protection of the Civil Service
System.32 Although the general appearance is that the federal government has
provided ample protection for the whistleblower, this is not the case. Instead,
the protections that do exist are fragmented and leave the private sector
employee with little protection and the in-house counsel with no protection.
1.

Statutory Protection

An assortment of federal acts, designed to address everything from coal
mine safety3' to atomic energy, 3' contain provisions protecting those who
exercise their rights and obligation under the acts. These laws can be broadly
grouped into two categories: (1) employment 3 and (2) public health and
"
safety. 33
' Although the protection granted by the various federal statutes
differs, most of the statutes protect the following types of activities: disclosure
of information, refusal to work, and the provision of testimony and other
participation in investigations.332
These statutes also vary in procedures used to redress the retaliatory
discharge.333 Protections are only available to employees who "blow the
whistle" on specific types of employer misconduct. These federal statutes have
no real applicability to the in-house attorney. They protect only certain activities
specified in the statute, none of which directly apply to in-house attorneys.
2.

Constitutional Protection

The First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
prohibit federal, state, and local governments from retaliating against

325. U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See generally Kohn, supra note 20.
326. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1988).
327. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (1988).
328. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (1988).
329. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988).
330. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1988).

331. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1955, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1988); Water Pollution Control Act
of 1948, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988).
332. See John L. Howard, Current Developments in Whistleblower Protection, 39 LAB. L.J.
67, 69-70 (1988).
333. See Howard, supra note 332, at 70.
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whistleblowers for engaging in protected speech. 334 The key element of these
amendments is that they only prevent the discharge of government employees
when their speech is a matter of public concern. 33' Thus, under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, government bodies are prohibited from retaliating
against whistleblowers for exercising their right to free speech. Although there
are exceptions, the First and Fourteenth Amendments only extend protection to
public sector employees and are of little benefit to the private sector
whistleblower. Consequently, the First and336Fourteenth Amendments have never
extended protection to in-house attorneys.
3.

National Labor Relations Act

Another possible avenue of federal whistleblower protection is the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).337 One of the NLRA's primary purposes is to
facilitate and to protect employees' ability to organize and to take collective
action.334 Specifically, the NLRA requires that labor be free to organize and
to bargain collectively on equal terms with employers. 339 The NLRA also
provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere
with an employee's exercise of these rights.34
Although the NLRA provides some protection for whistleblowers, the
protection is limited in that it does not apply to all employees.
Certain
employees are excluded from the NLRA's protection through the development

334. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-49 (1983). The Supreme Court in Connick
prohibited the discharge of government employees if their speech involved a matter of public
concern. Id. The Court looked to the content, form, and context of the statements to determine if
the speech was a matter of public concern. Id. at 147-48. See generally Kohn, supra note 20. A
detailed discussion of the issue surrounding Connick and the constitutional protections in general are
beyond the scope of this note.
335. If the speech is not a matter of public concern, then the First and Fourteenth Amendments
provide no protection and the government employee can be discharged for his or her speech. See
Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
336. See Tim Barnett, Overview of State Whistleblower Protection Statutes, 43 LAB L.J. 440,
441 (1992).
337. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 198, §§ 151-169, 49 Stat. 449
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169, § 158(a)(4) (1982)).
338. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (stating the purpose of the
Act). Section 7 of the Act guarantees that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection. . . ." Id. § 157.
339. Kent F. Murrmann, The Scanlon Plan Joint Committee and Section 8(a)(2), 31 LAB. L.J.
299, 300 (1980).
340. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
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of both statutory and judicial exclusions from the NLRA." ' The judicial
exclusions dealing with managerial and confidential employees would effectively
eliminate42 any possibility of protection for the in-house attorney under the
NLRA.
4.

Civil Service System Protection

The Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) was the first piece of comprehensive
legislation designed to protect the federal civil whistleblower. The CSRA set
out protections for employees who disclosed illegal activity or reported
These statutory protections also extended to federal
government fraud."
employees who disclosed substantial and specific dangers to public health or
safety.'
Under the CSRA, a hierarchy of administrative procedures were
developed to deal with such federal misconduct. Through the CSRA, Congress
balanced whistleblower protection against management's control in such a way
that management's control outweighed the protection afforded by the CSRA. 5
This resulted in the CSRA providing only weak whistleblower protection.
The protection afforded to federal employees has recently been increased
This Act
with the passage of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989.'
substantially strengthens the whistleblower protection available to the public

341. Supervisors have been statutorily excluded from protection. See Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982)).
This supervisory exclusion was qualified, however, in section 14(a) of the NLRA, by allowing
supervisors to organize at the employer's discretion. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 14(a),
29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1982).
In addition to the NLRA's statutory exclusions, courts and the National Labor Relations
Board, the agency which enforces the NLRA, have created two exclusions for managerial and
confidential employees. See Barbara A. Lee, Collective Bargaining and Employee Participation:
An Anomalous Interpretationof the National Labor Relations Act, 38 LAB. L.J. 274, 274 (1987).
Managerial employees are those who exercise independentjudgment on behalf of management. The
NLRB has never protected these employees. See id. at 277 (finding managerial exclusion as early
as 1946). Confidential employees, which are employees who have access to confidential information
concerning relations between a firm and its employees, have also been excluded from the NLRA's
protection. See ROBERT A. GORMAN, LABOR LAw - BAsiC TEXr 38-39 (1976).
342. See supra note 341 for further discussion of the managerial and confidential employee
exceptions.
343. See Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 17 (1989)
(Codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V 1993)). See Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection
Act of 1989: A False Hopefor Whistleblowers, 43 RtTGERs L. REv. 355, 373 (1991).
344. Id. In addition to introducing the whistleblower protections, the Civil Service Reform Act
also codified general merit principles to guide the civil service.
345. See Fisher, supra note 343, at 416.
346. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 17 (1989) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V 1993)).
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employee. 7 Despite this increase in protection for federal whistleblowers,
the Act still has problems.'
One significant flaw is its remedial structure.
This structure undermines the Act's effectiveness by placing the responsibility
of investigating the reported violations with the agency where the "whistle was
blown," not an independent agency. 9
This, in effect, results in an
opportunity for the agency to dismiss the reported violation. A second
shortcoming of the Whistleblower Act is the large number of federal agencies
that are exempted from its protections.'
Although the Whistleblower Act
provided added protection to the whistleblower, the amendments to CSRA's
whistleblower protections still favor the agency management, not the
whistleblower. 35' The most severe limitation on the protection provided by
both the Civil Service Reform Act and the Whistleblower Protection Act is that
they apply to public sector employees only. Thus, in-house counsel are again
provided no protection.
The existing federal protection afforded to whistleblowers is adequate only
if the employee works in the public sector. Private sector employees are
afforded minimal federal protection,352 however, they may be able to assert
some form of a whistleblower action under one of the federal statutes if they
disclose information or engage in sanctioned activities as provided by the

347. See Fisher, supra note 343, at 414-15. The Act strengthens the whistleblower'sprotection
as follows:
by making the Office of Special Counsel independent of the Merit Systems Protection
Board, redefining the Office of Special Counsel's prime mission as whistleblower
protection rather than Merit System protection, lessening the burden of proof the
whistleblower must meet to establish the nexus between whistleblowing and the
retaliation needed to prove a whistleblower claim, and giving the whistleblower an
independent right to bring his claim should the Special Counsel not champion his cause.
Id.
348. See Fisher, supra note 343, at 415.
349. See id. at 412-13. "The agency head investigates and reports back to the Special Counsel
on the merits of the whistleblower's claims." Id. at 412. For an agency head to admit that fraud,
waste, or abuse took place during the head's control of the agency "would be a black mark on an
agency head's career." Id. "[T]he incentive is for the head to find rational explanations for the
whistleblower's misapprehensions and dismiss the matter" so that it would not reflect adversely on
the agency head. Id.
350. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (West Supp. 1994). The 1989 Act exempts the following
agencies: government corporations, the FBI, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, the General Accounting Office, and any executive agency whose principal function
is intelligence or counter-intelligence. Id. § 2302(a)-(b); Fisher, supra note 343, at 407-08.
Although some of the exemptions for intelligence and investigatory agencies can be defended on the
grounds of national security, the extension of these exemptions to government corporations is
unpersuasive. The implications of these government corporation exemptions to the employees of
those corporations and to society in general are "daunting given the suspected corruption and waste
alleged to exist in sectors of the economy regulated or operated by such corporations." Id. at 409.
351. See Fisher, supra note 343, at 416.
352. See Barnett, supra note 336, at 441.
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particular statutes. 353 The in-house counsel is not considered in any of the
federal whistleblower protection statutes. The only possibility that in-house
attorneys have to receive any federal protection is if they happen to fit within the
proscribed activity available to private sector employees.3 '
B.

State Whistleblower Protection

A majority of states have enacted some sort of statute specifically designed
to provide protection for whistleblowers.355 These whistleblower statutes
challenge the acceptability of permitting employers to discharge employees who
observe something they consider to be illegal' and who take steps to bring it to
the attention of a supervisor or some other investigative body.3" In many
instances, unless an employee comes forward with information, unlawful or
unethical activities and procedures may never be discovered.357
Examination of these whistleblower statutes reveals that they vary
considerably from state to state. However, most of these whistleblower statutes
Few of the statutes extend
only apply to public sector whistleblowers. 3'
the thirty-three states with
Of
protection to private sector whistleblowers.
whistleblower statutes, about one-half extend protection to employees in the
private sector.3 59 Of those states that have enacted whistleblower statutes,
have enacted
and New Jersey'
Connecticut,"' Maine,'
Michigan,'

353. See Howard, supra note 332, at 69.
354. See Parker v. M & T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)
(recognizing that in-house attorneys are also employees of their employer and thus are covered by
the general whistleblower statute). See supra text accompanying notes 169-72 for further discussion
of the Parkercase.
355. At least 33 states have general whistleblower statutes. The states that have enacted
whistleblower protection statutes include: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. See supra note 20 and accompanying text for a list of each state's statute.
356. See John D. Feerick, Toward a Model Whistleblowing Law, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 585,
587 (1992).
357. Id.
358. See Barnett, supra note 336, at 448 table 1.
359. The states that have extended protection to the private sector include: California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. See Barnett, supra note 336, at 448, table
2.
360. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361 to 15.369 (West 1994).
361. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51 (West 1987).
362. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 831 to 839 (West 1988).
363. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34: 19-1 to 34: 19-8 (West 1988).
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the most comprehensive statutes.'
However, even among the state statutes
that extend protection to private sector whistleblowers, none directly address inhouse attorneys or the difficulties confronting them.w
Although a majority of states have passed legislation to protect the
whistleblower, current state protection is insufficient. The fact that a state has
a whistleblower statute on its books does not guarantee adequate protection for
all whistleblowers and all types of whistleblowing. This can specifically be seen
in the case of in-house attorneys, who are left without specific statutory
protection. To date, the only way that in-house attorneys have received
statutory protection has been when general whistleblower legislation was applied
to them.

3
6

364. These statutes are among the most comprehensive because they extend whistleblower
protection to state, local, and private sector employees. See 9A LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) IERM 505:
23. For further explanation of why these statutes are the most comprehensive and for an
examination of the effectiveness of whistleblower statutes on the whole, see generally Terry
Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblower Statutes: Are They Working?, 25 AM. Bus.
L.J. 241 (1987). The New Jersey whistleblower statute was held, in Parker v. M & T Chems.,
Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 222 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989), to extend protection to in-house
attorneys. The Parkercourt held that the in-house attorney was included in the statutes' definition
of employee. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 169-72 for further discussion of the Parker
case.
365. There have been several decisions which have taken a general state whistleblower statute
and applied it to an in-house attorney. See, e.g., Parker,566 A.2d at 215; Lepore v. National Tool
& Mfg. Co., 540 A.2d 1296 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), affid, 557 A.2d 1371 (N.J. 1989).
Currently, no state whistleblower statutes explicitly include the in-house attorney. The Illinois
General Assembly attempted to enact a specific statute granting in-house counsel the right to sue for
retaliatory discharge in 1989. The measure, however, failed to become law. See Abramson, supra
note 78, at 281-83. The proposed legislation stated:
Section 1. This Act shall be known and may be cited as the "Retaliatory Discharge for
In-House Attorneys Act."
Section 2. An attorney employed as an attorney by an employer in a full-time capacity
who is discharged by the employer under circumstances described herein shall not be
barred from maintaining an action for compensatory damages for the tort of retaliatory
discharge. An attorney may prevail in such an action only if the attorney can prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the determining factor in the discharge was the
attorney's refusal to participate in action in clear violation of statutes or of rules or
regulations having the force of law, amounting to fundamental public policy.
Section 3. In any action brought pursuant to Section 2, the complaint shall be filed
under seal and, at the discretion of the court, all pretrial proceedings may be conducted
in camera. In such an action, the attorney may reveal information obtained in his or her
capacity as an attorney for the employer, otherwise privileged, but only to the extent
necessary to establish the essential elements of the cause of action.
Section 4. This bill shall take effect upon becoming law.
Senate Bill No. 13, Illinois 86th General Assembly (1989).
366. See Parker,566 A.2d 215. The Parkercase is the only case where an in-house attorney
has received statutory whistleblower protection.
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C. Problems with and Inadequacies of Present Statutory Protection Schemes
The present statutory protection available for all whistleblowers, both at the
federal and state levels, is piecemeal and sketchy. The protection that does exist
largely neglects private sector employees and completely ignores in-house
counsel. 7 Although a majority of states have passed some sort of legislation
to protect whistleblowers, the current state protection for whistleblowers is
inadequate. Some states only offer protection to public sector employees.'
Among those states that offer statutory protection to the private sector
whistleblower, the protection and procedures of the statutes differ,' but the
statutes are similar in that they all fail to address the plight of in-house counsel.
The federal statutes also offer insufficient protection to all whistleblowers.
The anti-retaliation provisions found in various federal statutes apply only when
whistleblowers allege specific violations under those statutes."
The Civil
Service Reform Act and the Whistleblowers Protection Act of 1989 also offer
insufficient protection because they apply only to federal employees and have
other' inherent weaknesses.3 7'
The constitutional guarantees against
governmental interference with free speech do not apply in the context of the
private sector employer-employee relationship.372
Thus, although some
whistleblowers currently have statutory protection at the federal and state level
from the retaliatory acts of employers, in-house attorneys are left without any
federal or state statutory protection.
V. PROPOSED MODEL RETALIATORY DISCHARGE STATUTE
Although the preceding sections describe a wide variety of legal measures
that are available to protect the whistleblower, the existing protection is
inadequate for in-house attorneys. 3' This inadequacy stems primarily from the
limited scope and coverage of available protection. 74
Though certain
individuals and groups receive whistleblower protection, the in-house counsel
has been left with almost no protection at all.

367. See supra notes 346-66 and accompanying text. There has been only one state, Illinois,

that has attempted to pass a whistleblower statute that specifically addressed in-house counsel and
the problems confronting them. See supra note 365 for the text of the proposed statute.
368. See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
369. See generally Dworkin & Near, supra note 364, at 241.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 346-51.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 343-5 1; Fisher, supra note 343, at 412-16.
372. See supra text accompanying notes 334-36.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 81-117 and 319-66 for a discussion of the types of
protections available to whistleblowers.
374. See supra text accompanying notes 367-71 for further, discussion of the inadequacies of
the available whistleblower protection.
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This Note proposes a model whistleblower statute that grants in-house
attorneys the right to sue for retaliatory discharge. Retaliatory discharge suits
by in-house attorneys should parallel the existing cause of action granted to
general employees, with only minor modifications to account for the attorneys'
role as professional advisers.37 In-house attorneys should be allowed to sue
when retaliated against for urging their employer to act lawfully or for refusing
to violate professional codes of ethics. However, an employer should prevail
if other legitimate grounds exist for the action taken against the attorney.376
A.

Model Retaliatory Discharge Statute

SECTION ONE: DEFINITIONS
As used in this act:
a. "Employer" means any individual,7 partnership, association, or
37
corporation which employs an attorney.
b. "In-house attorney" means a lawyer who acts as an attorney for an
employer as though engaged as a full-time employee of that employer. "
c. "Retaliatory action" means the discharge, suspension or demotion of an
in-house attorney, or any other adverse employment action taken against an
in-house attorney in the terms, conditions, location, position, or privileges
3
of employment .1
d. "Public Body" means all of the following:
(1) the United States Congress, and state legislatures, or any
popularly-elected local governmental body, or any member or
employee of such governmental body;
(2) any federal, state, or local judiciary, or any member or employee
of the judiciary;

375. For examples of the existing cause of action for general employees, see, CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 31-51 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 831 to 839 (West 1988); MICH.
CONie. LAws ANN. §§ 15.361 to 15.369 (West 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to 34: 19-8
(West 1988).
376. The corporation should be able to defeat the attorney's retaliatory discharge claim if
independent grounds for the discharge, such as unsatisfactory work performance, exist. See, e.g.,
Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). The corporation
should also prevail if it addressed the corporate counsel's objection, and counsel merely disagreed
with the final policy. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 5059 513 (N.J. 1980)
(denying the employee's cause of action when the employer arguably complied with the public
policy, but the employee continued to protest).
377. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39: 19-2(a) (West 1988); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.361(b)
(West 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 832(2) (West 1988).
378. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 740 (6th ed. 1990); General Dynamics Corp. v. State
1993 WL 225346 n. 1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 8, 1993). This statute could be used to extend protection
to attorneys who are associates of law firms or associations. However, this statute is focused
primarily on in-house attorneys working for a corporation.
379. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34: 19-2(e) (West 1988).
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(3) any federal, state, or local regulatory, administrative, or public
agency or authority, or any member or employee of that body;
(4) any federal, state, or local law enforcement agency or any member
or employee of a law enforcement agency;
(5) any federal, state, or local department of an executive branch of
government; or
(6) any division, board, bureau, office, or commission or any of the
public bodies described in the above paragraphs of this subsection.'
SECTION TWO: EMPLOYER RETALIATORY ACTIONS
An in-house attorney shall be allowed to maintain a cause of action for
the tort of retaliatory discharge if the employer discharges, demotes,
transfers, or threatens to discharge, demote, or transfer, or otherwise
retaliates against an in-house attorney regarding the attorney's
compensation, terms, conditions, location, position, or privileges of
employment because the in-house attorney, acting in good faith, does any
of the following:
a. Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy, or practice
which the in-house attorney reasonably believes:
(1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation declared pursuant
to the law;
(2) is fraudulent or criminal in nature; or
(3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy.
b. Discloses, or intends to disclose to a supervisor or public body, an
activity, policy, or practice of the employer that the attorney reasonably
believes:
(1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation declared pursuant
to the law;
(2) is fraudulent or criminal in nature; or
(3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy."
SECTION THREE: INITIAL REPORTING TO EMPLOYER REQUIRED

The protection against retaliatory action provided by this statute does
not apply to an in-house attorney who makes a disclosure or causes the
disclosure of an activity, policy, request, or practice to a public body unless
the in-house attorney has first brought the alleged activity, policy, request,
or practice, by written notice, to the attention of a person having

380. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §
832(4) (West 1988); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.361(d) (West 1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:
19-2(c) (West 1988).
381. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833
(West 1988); MIcH. Coup. LAws ANN. § 15.362 (West 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34: 19-3 (West
1988).
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supervisory authority with the employer and has afforded the employer a
reasonable amount of time to correct the activity, policy, request, or
practice. Disclosure shall not be required where the in-house attorney is
reasonably certain that the alleged activity, policy, request, or practice will
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm to the attorney or to
another individual as a result of the disclosure, provided that the situation
is an emergency. 3 2
SECTION FOUR: BURDEN OF PROOF
The in-house attorney must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the discharge, demotion, transfer, or retaliatory action, whether actual
or threatened, was the result of the in-house attorney's:
a. refusal to participate or comply with the employer's activity, policy,
request, or practice; or
b. reporting of the alleged activity, policy, request, or practice which was
in clear violation of either statutes, rules or regulations having the force of
law, or a clearly mandated public policy.3
FIvE: PROCEDURE OF ACTION - ARBITRATION
An in-house attorney who alleges that an activity, policy, request, or
practice which is in clear violation of the law or rules or regulations having
the force of law, as referred to in Section Two, and who has complied with
Sections Three and Four may, within one year, bring a complaint before
an arbitrator or arbitration committee for retaliatory discharge.' A neutral

SECTION

382. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833(2) (West 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34: 19-4
(West 1986); MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.6(b)(l). This provision is modeled in part after
Model Rule 1.6(b)(l). Model Rule 1.6(b)(l) states:
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely
to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm;
Id.
383. See supra note 365 for the text of Senate Bill 13 of the Illinois 86th General Assembly
(1989).
384. The in-house attorney who brings a retaliatory discharge suit will be required to go
through an initial compulsory arbitration hearing. Several objections have been raised as to the
constitutionality of compulsory arbitration proceedings. Some courts have declared such proceedings
unconstitutional as either depriving the parties of liberty and property without due process of law,
see, e.g., Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus.
Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923), or as depriving parties of their constitutional right to a trial by jury,
see, e.g., In re Smith, 112 A.2d 625 (Pa. 1955). Compulsory arbitration has, however, been held
to be a valid method of dispute resolution in certain situations. A distinction may be drawn between
the directly coercive and unconstitutional statutes, which, in effect, close the courts to litigants by
compelling resort to arbitrators for final determinations of rights, and statutes designed merely to
aid the courts by providing for arbitration in certain cases but reserving a right of appeal in the
courts. Statutes of the latter class have generally been held valid. See, e.g., Deibeikis v. Link-Belt
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arbitrator must be selected by mutual agreement of the in-house attorney
and employer or, in the absence of agreement, as provided in the Uniform
Arbitration Act.? The arbitration proceeding itself shall be governed by
the Uniform Arbitration Act.'
If there is a conflict between the
Uniform Arbitration Act and this Section, this Section shall govern. The
arbitrator's award is final and binding, and is subject to review under the
provisions of Section Six of this Act.'
SECTION Six:

REVIEW OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE

After exhausting all available arbitration remedies as specified in
Section Five, either party may appeal the arbitrator's decision by a petition
for judicial review to the appropriate state court. The petition for judicial
review of the arbitrator's decision will be held in camera, where the judge
will make an initial determination of whether the appeal should
proceed.'
If the judge finds that the arbitrator's decision was not
clearly erroneous, the decision of the arbitrator will stand and will be
binding on both parties.'
If the judge finds that the arbitrator's decision

Co., 104 N.E. 211 (111.1914); In re Smith, 112 A.2d 625 (Pa. 1955). This model retaliatory
discharge statute requires compulsory arbitration to prevent the disclosure of confidential material
and allows for later judicial review on appeal. For further discussion of compulsory arbitration, see,
e.g., Robert Layton et al., Using CompulsoryArbitration To Resolve EEO Disputes, Arbitration and
the Law 1991-92, AAA General Counsel's Annual Report, at 118; Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
385. See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 39-2-913(2)(a) (1987); UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 3, 7
U.L.A. 96 (1985). Section 3 of the Uniform Arbitration Act, Appointment of Arbitrators by Court,
states that:
[i]f the arbitration agreement provides a method of appointment of arbitrators, this method
shall be followed. In absence thereof, or if the agreed method fails or for any reason cannot
be followed, or when an arbitrator appointed fails or is unable to act and his successor has not
been duly appointed, the court on application of a party shall appoint one or more arbitrators.
An arbitrator so appointed has all the powers of one specifically named in the agreement.
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 3, 7 U.L.A. 96 (1985).
The Uniform Arbitration Act is a model set of rules dealing with arbitration and has been
adopted by a majority of the states. Jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act
include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. See UNIFORM
ARBITRATION ACT, 7 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1993).
386. UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT §§ 5-7, 7 U.L.A. 99-116 (1985).
387. See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 39-2-914 (1989).
388. See supra note 365 for the text of Senate Bill 13 of the Illinois 86th General Assembly
(1989).
389. The scope of judicial review of an arbitration decision is extremely narrow. See Fort
Wayne Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. Board of Sch. Trustees, 569 N.E.2d 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). Courts
have held that an arbitrator's decision and findings will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.
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was clearly erroneous, the case shall proceed to trial in a closed session
court."
Proper venue and jurisdiction shall be where the violation is
alleged to have occurred or where the employer has its principal office.
SECTION SEVEN: DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL

In a retaliatory discharge action, as specified in the previous sections,
the in-house attorney may reveal information obtained in his or her capacity
as an attorney for the employer, which is otherwise confidential or
necessary to establish the essential
privileged, but only to the extent
39
elements of the cause of action. 1
SECTION EIGHT:

REMEDIES AVAILABLE - ARBrrRATION AND COURTS

The arbitrator or court, in rendering a judgment in an action pursuant
to this statute, shall order, as considered appropriate, the payment of back
wages, actual damages, punitive damages, or any combination of these
remedies. The arbitrator or court may also award the complainant all or
a portion of the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney fees and
witness fees, if the arbitrator or court determines that the award is
appropriate.392
SECTION NINE: FALSE REPORTING

An in-house attorney found to have knowingly made a meritless,
malicious, fraudulent, or bad faith claim of retaliatory discharge against the
employer shall be subject to disciplinary action by the bar disciplinary body

See, e.g., Grobet File Co. of Am., Inc. v. RTC Sys., Inc., 524 N.E.2d 404 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988);
Marciniak v. Amid, 412 N.W.2d 248 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Miller v. Swanson, 289 N.W.2d 875
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980); D.M. Ward Const. Co., Inc. v. Electric Corp. of Kansas City, 803 P.2d
593 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
390. Discussion of the constitutional issues involving trial in a closed session court are beyond
the scope of this note.
391. Allowing the in-house attorney to reveal privileged or confidential information obtained
in his or her capacity as a lawyer corresponds with Model Rule 1.6(b). See MODEL RULES, supra
note 33, Rule 1.6(b)(2). Rule 1.6(b)(2) states that:
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes

necessary:
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against

the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.

Id.
This section does not apply to disclosure of company trade secrets. The determination of whether
trade secrets can be disclosed by the in-house attorney must be left to the individual state trade secret

rules.
392. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51 (West 1987); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §
832(4) (West 1988); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 15.361(d) (West 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:
19-2(c) (West 1986).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss3/7

Kobus: Establishing Corporate Counsel's Right to Sue for Retaliatory Dis

1995]

CORPORATE COUNSEL'S RIGHTS

1409

of the appropriate jurisdiction?"
B.

Commentary to the Model Retaliatory DischargeStatute

COMMENTARY TO SECTION TWO:

This section grants in-house attorneys the right to sue for retaliatory
discharge if they are able to show several elements. First, the in-house
attorneys must show that their actions, objections, refusals, or disclosures, were
based on a good faith belief that their employers had committed, or were about
to commit, the suspected activities. 3
The in-house attorneys must
demonstrate evidence of several factors to establish that they acted in good faith.
The attorneys must present evidence of the alleged misconduct, of the attorneys'
knowledge of the laws, rules or regulations that the employers allegedly
disregarded, and of the efforts made by the attorneys to confirm the accuracy
of their perceptions of both their employer's conduct, and the governing legal
restrictions. 395 The attorney should also present this evidence within a
reasonable time after discovery of such action. Second, the in-house attorney
must honestly and reasonably believe that the wrongdoing will occur absent
intervention. The term "reasonably believes," as used in this Section, is meant

to be an objective standard of what the average in-house attorney would believe
if put in the same or a similar situation.
The laws, rules, and regulations referred to in Section Two of the model
statute include the applicable code of ethics. An attorney's code of ethics fits
under the "rule[s] or regulation[s] declared pursuant to law" language in Section
Two.
The phrase "incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy" is

393. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West 1987); MODEL CODE, supra note 33, DR
1-102. DR 1-102 states that:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another.
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonestly, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
Id.
394. See Section 2 (a) 1-3 and (b) 1-3 of the Model Retaliatory Discharge Statute, supra note
94, for a list of the suspected activities.
395. See standard suggested in WESTMAN, supra note 8, at 151; see also good faith belief
requirement in, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E: 2 (1988); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney
1988).
396. See Section 2(a)(1) and (b)(1) of the Model Retaliatory Discharge Statute, supra note 94.
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meant to indicate a policy which is required by state statute or regulation. 3"
If the statute or regulation is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, then it will not qualify as a clear mandate of public policy. 3
Furthermore, the public policy at issue does not have to be expressly stated to
be clearly mandated. It is sufficient if the public policy is apparent from a study
of the statute as a whole, or even a group of statutes. 399
COMMENTARY TO SECTION THREE:

Requiring the in-house attorney to inform the corporation of the suspected
violation or misconduct is an attempt to resolve disputes between the in-house
attorney and the employer within the corporation and out of the public eye.
This will help prevent any violation of attorney-client confidentiality or
privilege.'
This condition corresponds with the Model Rules' requirement
of first trying to rectify the problem internally."'
Requiring internal disclosure will also ensure that the least damaging
measure is taken by the attorney in disclosing or reporting the misconduct. 402

397. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text for a further discussion of clearly mandated
public policy.
398. See Merck v. Advanced Draining Sys., Inc., 921 F.2d 549, 555-56 (4th Cir. 1990).
399. See Warthen v. Toms River Community Memorial Hosp., 488 A.2d 229, 232 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1984); Schaffer v. Federal Trust Co., 28 A.2d 75, 79 (N.J. 1942).
400. See supra text accompanying notes 240-60 for a further discussion on attorney-client
confidentiality and privilege.
401. See MODELRULE, supra note 33, Rule 1.13(b)(1) to (3) (1994). Rule 1.13(b) states that:
[i]f a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated
with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related
to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation
of law which reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in
the best interest of the organization.
Id.
Rule 1.13(b) (1) through (3) deals with the types of measures that the lawyer should consider
taking if confronted with such a situation described in Rule 1.13(b). Such measures the lawyer may
take include:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presentation to
appropriate authority in the organization; and
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the
seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the
organization as determined by applicable law.
MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.13(b)(1) to (3).
402. Similarly, under the retaliatory discharge statutes of both New York and Maine, the
employees are eligible to sue only if they first disclose the violation to a supervisor and give the
employer a chance to correct it. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833 (West 1988); N.Y. LAB.
LAW § 740 (McKinney 1988). To allow suits by attorneys who report certain activities of the
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Only after the employer fails to rectify the problem must it be reported to
outside officials. 3 Internal disclosure will also ensure that the in-house
counsel's actions do not unnecessarily aggravate the employer's harm and
embarrassment which is inherent in the situation. For the attorney to recover
at all for the retaliatory actions of the employer, the attorney must have first
informed the employer of the alleged misconduct, so that the employer would
be aware of any potential harm. '
This would, therefore, eliminate any
chances of the employer being unnecessarily harmed or embarrassed.
There is one very limited exception to the general requirement of initial
disclosure to the employer. Only in emergency situations, in which the
attorneys believe with reasonable certainty that serious harm will come to
themselves or to another individual, will outside disclosure be allowed without
prior internal disclosure to the employer.'
The reasonable certainty standard
is to be judged by the standard of the objective in-house attorney, and should be
treated as equivalent to the clear and convincing evidence standard. This would
help avoid meritless claims against the employer.
COMMENTARY TO SECTION FOUR:

Requiring that the in-house attorney show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the retaliatory action of the employer occurred will help to deter
false or weak allegations by the in-house attorney. The preponderance of the
evidence standard is sufficiently stringent to protect the employer's interests in
avoiding groundless allegations, while at the same time being low enough to
encourage suits by in-house attorneys who have had retaliatory actions taken
against them.
The employer also has several methods which it can use to overcome the
attorney's claim of retaliatory discharge. First, if the employer had independent
grounds for the discharge of the attorney-such as unsatisfactory work
performance-then the retaliatory discharge claim will fail.' 6 Second, the

employer to an outside agency without first reporting internally would encourage attorneys to
disclose damaging information without giving the employer a chance to alter its behavior.
403. See Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hosp. Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1355-56 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding that a press conference was reasonable to improve black patient care when meetings with
administrators proved unproductive).
404. See Section Three of the Model Retaliatory Discharge Statute.
405. This provision is in conformity with Model Rule 1.6(b)(1). See MODEL RULES, supra
note 33, Rule 1.6(b)(1); see supra note 382 for the text of Rule 1.6(b)(1).
406. See Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)
(stating that despite the employee's exercise of protected speech, the employer may fire the employee
for independent, legitimate reasons). See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 41! U.S. 792,
802-07 (1973) (stating that, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, once the plaintiff has
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corporation will also prevail if it convinces the arbitrator or court that it
addressed the corporate counsel's objection, but that counsel disagreed with the
final policy.') The employer will also prevail if it convinces the arbitrator or
court that the danger to the public did not justify the harm to the employer, and,
therefore, the right to discharge its attorney should be preserved.
COMMENTARY TO SECTION FIVE:
Initially requiring compulsory arbitration to determine whether a violation
occurred would be particularly useful in these types of cases because compulsory
arbitration has the effect of protecting the privileged and confidential material.
Arbitration is a common way to settle other attorney-client disputes, such as
conflicts over fees, and is equally appropriate in the retaliatory discharge
context.4
Arbitration benefits both the attorney and the employer in retaliatory
discharge cases. The employer would be rid of the unpredictability of the jury
system and the accompanying potential of extensive compensatory and punitive
damages.'
The employers would also have a forum in which the particulars
of managerial performance could be handled more expertly. 4"° At the same
time, arbitration would be beneficial for attorneys. The arbitration process
would offer attorneys the ability to confront their accusers at a hearing and
would also provide the attorneys with relatively unrestricted access to a process
41
that would promise timely relief. '
COMMENTARY TO SECTION SIX:
Requiring that the initial judicial review of the arbitrator's decision be held
in camera would further protect the employer's interest in confidentiality.
During this judicial review, the judge would determine whether the arbitrator's

established a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer may rebut with evidence of a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action).
407. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980) (denying an
employee's cause of action when the employer arguably complied with the public policy but the
employee continued to protest).
408. See, e.g., Guralnick v. Supreme Court, 747 F. Supp. 1109 (D.N.J. 1990) (discussing New
Jersey system of fee arbitration, wherein a client challenge to a fee results in mandatory submission
of the matter to arbitration).
409. See William B. Gould, V, Stemming the Wrongfid Discharge 7ide: A Case for
Arbitration, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 404, 415-16 (1987-88).
410. Id.
411. Id. Although the benefits of arbitration appear to weigh in favor of the employer, the
attorney is given the overriding benefit of the opportunity to bring a claim. The benefits that do
weigh in the employer's favor are intended to ensure that no confidential material will be exposed
to the public.
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decision was clearly erroneous or supported by the facts of the case. Numerous
court decisions have held that the clearly erroneous standard is the appropriate
standard of review of an arbitrator's decision. 12
In addition, requiring that the arbitrator's decision be clearly erroneous will
further prevent confidential and privileged information from being disclosed
after the arbitration process. If, during the initial judicial review, the judge
determines that substantive errors were made during the arbitration process
which led to a clearly erroneous decision, then the claim shall proceed to a
review by a closed session court. Requiring that the initial appeal be done
through an in camera judicial review, and proceeding to a closed session court
review only if the arbitration decision was clearly erroneous, also reduces the
chances of any unnecessary disclosure of confidential or privileged information.
COMMENTARY TO SECTION SEVEN:

Allowing in-house attorneys to reveal confidential and privileged
information obtained while the attorney was the in-house counsel conforms with
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct's exception to confidentiality. 413 The
in-house attorneys should be allowed to reveal this information in defending
themselves against their employers' retaliatory actions. 414 This provision
applies to all of the stages of the retaliatory discharge proceeding, including the
arbitration, judicial review, and closed session court stages. If attorneys
disclose confidential information outside any of these judicial proceedings, they
will be subject to disciplinary action as required by the bar association of the
applicable jurisdiction. 40 Disclosure by the attorney under Section Seven
should not be interpreted as a client's waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
Therefore, the attorney will be prevented, by privilege, from testifying against
the corporation in any other suits.
COMMENTARY TO SECTION EIGHT:

In order to minimize the intrusion on the corporation's ability to fire its
attorneys, the damage awards should generally be limited to compensatory
damages. The attorney should not be allowed to collect punitive damages,
except in situations involving outrageous and malicious retaliatory conduct by

412. See supra note 389.
413. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.6(b)(2); see supra note 391 for the text of Rule
1.6(b)(2).
414. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 1.6(b)(2). See supra text accompanying notes
301-10 for a further discussion of the confidentiality exception.
415. See Parkerv. M &T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 220 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
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the employer.4"6 In these cases, the arbitrator or court may award punitive
damages if the arbitrator or court determines that such an award is appropriate.
Allowing the attorney compensation for actual damages provides sufficient
incentive for in-house counsel to sue when appropriate.1 7
Although some courts have granted reinstatement in retaliatory discharge
suits brought by general employees when such relief is specifically authorized
by statute, 1 8 reinstatement would be an unsuitable method of relief in suits
under this model statute. Reinstatement has been seen as an inappropriate
remedy in cases involving professionals, because a professional employee's
effectiveness depends on the trust and cooperation of the employer. 49
Further, reinstatement is not appropriate because of the specialized skills
required in professional employment. 4' These same reasons should limit an
in-house counsel's remedy to monetary damages. The need for trust in the
relationship between the attorney and the client is an essential part of the
relationship.42 The loss of trust after the attorney has successfully sued the
employer would significantly interfere with an effective working relationship.

416. The reason for limiting recovery to compensatory damages and generally not punitive
damages is because of the uncertainty and high awards that accompany punitive damages, which
generally impinge too greatly on an employer's liberty to terminate counsel. See LAWRENCE E.
DUBE, JR., MANAGEMENT ON TRIAL: THE LAW OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 79 (1987); Gould,
supra note 409, at 406. Corporations would be less willing to discharge employees if there was a
chance that they would be liable for high punitive damage awards.
Some jurisdictions have already declined to impose punitive damages, finding that they
interfere too greatly with the employer's ability to fire at will. See, e.g., Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wis. 1983) (finding that retaliatory discharge should be based
on contract law so as to limit the remedies to making the plaintiff whole). Other jurisdictions have
recognized punitive damages as appropriate relief, but have refused to award them in cases arising
before the tort cause of action had been recognized. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 517
(Or. 1975) (en bane).
417. Compensatory damage awards also tend to be large in suits by high level employees
alleging loss of salary. See Gould, supra note 409, at 405 (stating that a private study of jury
awards in California from 1982 through 1986 found the average award in retaliatory discharge cases
to be $652,100).
418. See DUBE, supra note 416, at 71-72; Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)13vi,
5 U.S.C. § 1221 (e) (Supp. 1 1989); National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 10(c), 29 U.S.C.
§160(c) (1988); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 7 0 6 (g), 42 U.S.C. § 200 0 e-5(g) (1988).
419. See Kurle v. Evangelical Hosp. Ass'n., 411 N.E.2d 326, 332 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(denying nurse temporary reinstatement).
420. See Zannis v. Lake Shore Radiologists, Ltd., 392 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)
(denying doctor reinstatement).
421. See General Dynamics Corp. v. State 1993 WL 225346 (Cal. Ct. App. June 8, 1993).
The General Dynamics court stated that "[a]t the heart of the attorney-client relationship is the
element of trust . . . . The client of an in-house counsel may find it difficult to develop such a
relationship of trust and confidence if the attorney, once discharged, may 'turn on' the employer in
contesting his termination." Id.
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COMMENTARY TO SECTION NINE:

The statute should address the possibility of some attorneys bringing
malicious, meritless, or bad faith actions against their former employer.
Attorneys who file frivolous actions under this model statute should be
disciplined for doing so. Hence, this statute would subject the in-house attorney
who has brought a malicious, fraudulent, or bad faith retaliatory discharge claim
to disciplinary action by the bar association of the attorney's jurisdiction.'
V1.

CONCLUSION

Retaliatory discharge claims, clearly needed in general employment
situations, should also be available to in-house attorneys because of the unique
position these attorneys occupy. 4'
Their employment situations, subject as
they are to the control of the corporate employer, render in-house counsel as
vulnerable to arbitrary dismissal as any other at-will employee. In addition, the
single-client nature of the in-house counsel's practice distinguishes this job from
the traditional attorney-client relationship.4'
A retaliatory discharge action would protect the in-house counsel from the
difficulties of their unique position as well as from incorrigible employers.'z
It would advance the objectives of the legal system without disrupting the ethical
duty of confidentiality or the attorney-client privilege.
Moreover, the
applicability of the tort can be limited so as to not damage the mutual trust
central to the attorney-client relationship. Retaliatory discharge also eliminates
the inadequacy of the alternative option of withdrawal.'
For these reasons,
recovery in tort for retaliatory discharge should be allowed for corporate
counsel.
John Jacob Kobus, Jr.

422. See Parker v. M & T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215,220 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
See also General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 504 (Cal. 1994) (stating that
"an attorney who unsuccessfully pursues a retaliatory discharge suit, and in doing so discloses
privileged client confidences, may be subject to State Bar disciplinary proceedings").
423. See supra text accompanying notes 276-87.
424. See supra text accompanying notes 278-79.
425. See supra text accompanying notes 162-68.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 192-216.
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